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The AB (ABC) and BA Transactions:
An Economic and Tax Analysis of
Reserved and Carved Out Income Interests




A owns the fee in Blackacre, income producing real estate, and con-
veys the remainder therein to B while reserving a present interest in him-
self. To what extent, if any, is B subject to federal income tax on
amounts received by A as rents from Blackacre? This question, and its
variations, was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in the
early oil and gas cases.' The Court held in Thomas v. Perkins 2 that
amounts payable to A solely from the oil produced by the land were not
to be included in B's income. In recent years, the same issue has again
come before the courts in cases involving nonmineral interests. Although
the result and reasoning of Perkins prevailed in some of the earlier
cases, 3 the later cases have either ignored Perkins or distinguished it as
applying only to sales of depletable mineral interests in property.4 In-
deed, in the area of mineral interests, Congress has reversed Perkins and
codified the results of these later cases by the enactment in 1969 of sec-
tion 636(b) of the Code, which treats A as selling the property and thus
requires B to include the income. The same result obtains under section
1235 on a sale of a patent with a retained royalty interest. On the other
hand, Congress has exhibited the same confusion as the courts by de-
creeing that B should not include the income where A and B have re-
ceived their interests by gift or bequest (in trust or otherwise).'
* KENNETH F. JOYCE and Louis A. DEL CoTTo are Professors of Law, State
University of New York at Buffalo.
'See Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940); Thomas v. Perkins, 301
U.S. 655 (1937); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
2301 U.S. 655 (1937).
'See, e.g., McCulley Ashlock, 18 T.C. 405 (1952); Ruth W. Collins, 14 T.C.
301 (1950).
4 See, e.g., Comm'r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965); Bryant v. Comm'r, 399
F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1968); Alstores Realty Corp., 46 T.C. 363 (1966); Raymond
L. Allen, 34 T.C.M. 242 (1975).
I.R.C. §§ 102(b) (2), 273, 1001(e).
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Despite the presence of the statutes and the cases which deny Perkins,
the issue will not down. The propriety of taxing B on A's receipts raises
the basic issue 6 of what (and whose) income it is that is being taxed to
B.7 This article will analyze this basic issue through a fundamental prin-
ciple of income taxation: Amounts are includable in one's income only
to the extent she/he in fact receives the economic benefit of such
amounts. We shall also analyze through this fundamental principle the
pertinent cases in the area, those dealing directly with the AB issue, such
as Bryant v. Commissioner' and A istores Realty Corp.,' and those which
are not so clearly perceived as AB cases but nevertheless raise the same
issue, such as Commissioner v. Brown."0
"Carved Out" Economic Interest:
The BA Transaction
The same basic issue raised by the AB transaction is raised in the BA
transaction, where B owns the fee in Blackacre, income producing real
estate, and conveys a present interest to A for cash consideration, retain-
ing a reversion in himself. Is this a sale by B, thus requiring A to report
the income until B's reversion takes effect in possession, or is it to be
treated merely as a loan from A to B to be repaid by B from the income
produced by Blackacre and reported by B? This issue is implicit in
Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc.,1 and Woodsam Associates, Inc. v.
Commissioner,12 and is addressed in Estate of Stranahan v. Commis-
sioner" and J.A. Martin v. Commissioner.4 It will be analyzed in this
article, again by applying the principle of whether B receives the eco-
nomic benefit of the income received by A.
6 In the recent case of Carr Staley, Inc. v. United States, 496 F.2d 1366 (5th
Cir. 1974), this issue was unsuccessfully argued as a constitutional question.
Articles discussing this issue in the context of the oil ABC transaction are
Hambrick, Another Look at Some Old Problems-Percentage Depletion and the
ABC Transaction, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1965), and Wilkinson, ABC Trans-
actions and Related Income Tax Plans, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 18 (1961). Use of the
ABC transaction in real estate acquisitions is discussed in Tanenbaum, The ABC
Technique of Financing Real Estate Acquisitions: The Tax Motivated Leasehold,
111 U. PA. L. REV. 161 (1962).
8399 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1968).
S46 T.C. 363 (1966).
10380 U.S. 563 (1965).
11356 U.S. 260 (1958).
12 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
.3 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).
14 56 T.C. 1255 (1971), aff'd without opinion, 469 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Preliminary Analysis of Legal and Economic Issues
At the outset we may conveniently set forth a few boundaries and a
proposition we take as generally accepted:
(1) The issues with which we deal herein do not require an ex-
haustive analysis of the scope of the term "income" under the Internal
Revenue Code or the sixteenth amendment to the Constitution. The
concept of "realized gain" as it has developed will suffice for our pur-
poses, although obviously the concept is not without its own problems.
(2) We are not required to present a comprehensive discussion of
the sources of realized gain since the issues which concern us can be
(and most often are) raised with reference to gain from income pro-
ducing property, such as rental realty, stocks and business assets.'"
(3) We take as a generally acceptable and applicable proposition
under the Code, if not the Constitution, that with respect to any given
item of income producing property, a taxpayer is to be taxed only on
the amount of realized gain which is attributable to his interest in that
particular property.'6
To begin discussion, let us assume that A owns Blackacre, which is
earning, and for the foreseeable future will continue to earn, an annual
net ground' 7 rent of $10,000. The prevailing interest rate is 10 percent
and Blackacre thus has, and for the foreseeable future will continue to
have, a present value of $100,000." In fact, assume that A has just
'" This is not to suggest that similar issues do not arise with respect to gain from
other sources, such as personal services or windfalls (e.g., prizes or found prop-
erty).
" See, e.g., Hoeper v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin, 284 U.S. 206, 215
(1931), where the Supreme Court held that the Wisconsin income tax statute re-
quiring a husband to report on his own return the aggregate income of himself
and his wife violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Consti-
tution, stating: "We have no doubt that, because of the fundamental conceptions
which underlie our system, any attempt by a state to measure the tax on one per-
son's property or income by reference to the property or income of another is
contrary to due process of law."
In the course of the article we will have occasion to compare the issues referred
to in our introduction with those raised in the assignment of income area where
at least arguably an exception has been carved out by the courts and Congress to
this general rule taxing a taxpayer only on the gain attributable to his property
interest.
'-,In order to make the calculations more simple and understandable, we have
omitted any reference to depreciable improvements.
'
8 The figure of $100,000 is derived through the use of the formula:
v=n
I
where V is the present value of property with a permanent net annual yield (n)
of $10,000 where the interest rate (i) is 10 percent.
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purchased Blackacre for $100,000. At the end of year 1, A receives
$10,000 rent and Blackacre is still worth $100,000. The $10,000 rent,
as we know, will be taxed to A in full as "income."
Why is A considered to have $10,000 realized gain? A typical an-
swer might go something like this: At the beginning of year 1, A had
$100,000 (Blackacre). At the end of year 1, A has $110,000 consist-
ing of $10,000 rent and Blackacre worth $100,000. Moreover, the
$10,000 rent is "realized," i.e., it has been separated from Blackacre
and is not merely an increase in the market value of Blackacre. Such
an answer, however, conceals the underlying economic realities and
their tax treatment. In the first place, we know that A would be taxed
on $10,000 regardless of whether he had moved, with respect to Black-
acre, from a $100,000 position at the beginning of year I to a $110,000
position at the end of year 1. If, e.g., Blackacre was worth only $95,000
at the end of year 1, A would still be taxed on $10,000.
More important, even if we assume, as we have, that A has had an
economic gain of $10,000 with respect to Blackacre in year 1, only a
very small part (on our facts, 10 percent) of that gain can be attributed
to the $10,000 rent paid to A for the use of Blackacre for year 1. To
clarify this last proposition, let us assume that all that A had purchased
was a one year term for years in Blackacre. On our facts, A would have
paid about $9,000 for that one year term.'" Therefore, at the end of
year 1 when A receives rent of $10,000, his economic gain would be
only $1,000. Now, the only difference between the A who buys Black-
acre and the A who buys only a one year term in Blackacre is that the
A who buys Blackacre has bought a longer (potentially infinite) interest
in Blackacre; i.e., the purchaser of the fee has purchased, in addition to
year 1, the interest of year 2, et cetera, ad infinitum. But it is clear that
the purchaser of the fee has in fact purchased year 1, and it is equally
clear that the purchaser of the fee has paid about $9,000 for year 1
since that is its present value. It follows, therefore, that at the end of
year 1, A, who has received $10,000 rent, has had the same amount of
gain attributable to year 1, whether he has purchased the fee or only a
one year term, i.e., $1,000.
There is no doubt, however, as stated at the outset, that the A who
has purchased the fee will be taxed on $10,000, whereas the A who has
"9 The more precise figure is $9,090.90 derived through the use of the formula:
p_ n+Iqi)t
where P is the present value of $10,000 (n) to be received one year (t) from the
present time where the interest rate (i), expressed as a decimal, is 10 percent.
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purchased the one year term will be taxed on only S 1,000. Why is this
so? The answer under the Code would be explained: The A who has
purchased a fee has purchased a nonwasting asset. He is therefore un-
able to amortize any of his $100,000 cost to reduce his gain from the
rent in year 1; i.e., the A who has purchased the fee is not allowed to
offset his receipt ($10,000) from year 1 by what he paid ($9,000) for
year 1. But the A who has purchased only year 1 is allowed under the
principles (if not the letter) of section 167," to amortize his $9,000
and thus report only $1,000 because he has purchased a wasting asset.
Now, whatever be the merits of the rationale just stated and, indeed,
wholly apart from the soundness of the resulting distinction in the tax
treatment of wasting and nonwasting assets, the economic reality re-
mains that the economic gain or what the economists might call the "net
productivity"- 1 attributable to the use of Blackacre for year 1 is only
$1,000 whether the owner of year 1 owns only year 1 or also owns all
the other years, i.e., the fee. In what way, then, can A who purchased
the fee be considered to have $10,000 of gain at the end of year 1? Or,
stating the question in another way, on our assumption that Blackacre
is worth $100,000 at the end of year 1, what is the explanation of the
fact that A has moved during year 1, vis-4-vis Blackacre, from a
$100,000 position to a $110,000 position?
The tax explanation is that A (the one year term owner) is allowed
a $9,000 amortization deduction, while A (the fee owner) is disallowed
this deduction. Thus, the tax explanation would view the $9,000 dif-
ference as a distortion of fee owner A's taxable income. Economically,
however, there is no distortion and A who owns the fee is properly taxed
on $9,000 more. The economic source of this extra $9,000 is in all of
Blackacre's years beyond year 1. In the language of the law of property,
A who owns the fee simple in Blackacre can be correctly described, as
of the beginning of year 1, as owning a one year term for years plus a
remainder in fee simple.2 2 Using the figures of our example, at the be-
ginning of year 1, A's one year term is worth about S9,000 and his
20The principle of amortization of a shrinking or wasting interest in an intan-
gible asset like a term for years is the counterpart of depreciation for the wear
and tear of tangible assets.
21 See, e.g., SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 645-77 (5th ed. 1961).
-2The remainder in fee simple describes A's interest in all of Blackacre's years
other than year 1. When a person like A, with such a remainder, also owns year
1, he is stated, simply, to own the fee simple.
' See N. 19 supra.
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remainder in fee simple is worth about $91,000.24 At the end of year 1,
his one year term, now expired, has generated $10,000 and his remain-
der in fee simple, i.e., his interest in years 2 ad infinitum, is now worth
$100,000. It is this increase in the value of his remainder in fee simple
-from $91,000 to $100,000-which is the economic source of $9,000
of the $10,000 on which A is taxed as income. Given our factual as-
sumptions, therefore, when A is taxed on $10,000, $1,000 is attribut-
able to the increase in value of his year 1 interest from $9,000 to
$10,000, and $9,000 is attributable to the increase in value of his re-
mainder fee from $91,000 to $100,000.2.5,
The importance of the above analysis of A who owns Blackacre in fee
simple lies in its implication for the analysis of the situations to which
this article is addressed-i.e., situations which involve, by whatever route
reached, a temporal division of ownership interests (i.e., "present"
versus "future" interests) in Blackacre between or among more than one
taxpayer. For example, using the same basic figures as before, suppose
that C owns Blackacre which is earning $10,000 net annual ground rent
and, at a prevailing interest rate of 10 percent, is worth $100,000. C
conveys to A a two year term for years and conveys to B the remainder
in fee. A pays C about $17,000 ($9,000 for year 1 and $8,000 for
year 2-'1) and B pays C about $83,000.27 At the end of year 1, A re-
ceives $10,000 rent.
At this point, the question asked is typically phrased as follows:
24 The more precise figure is $90,909.09 derived from the use of the formula
set forth in N. 19 supra: P - (1 n i
where P is the present value of $100,000 to be received a year from the present
where the interest rate is 10 percent.
25 It should be noted again that A, the fee owner, will be taxed on $10,000 even
if his remainder has not increased from $91,000 to $100,000. If, e.g., Blackacre
has suffered market depreciation and is worth only $95,000 at the end of year 1,
A will still be taxed on $10,000 if he receives this amount as net rent. By the
same token A will not be taxed on any more than $10,000 even if Blackacre is
worth more than $100,000 at the end of year 1.
2 G The more precise figure for year 1 is $9,090.90 (see N. 19 supra). The more
precise figure for year 2 is $8,264.46, derived through the formula set forth in
N. 19 supra: (P
where P is the present value of $10,000 to be received two years from the present
time where the interest is 10 percent.
27 The more precise figure is $82,644.63 derived through the formula set forth
in N. 19 supra: P n- (1T )
where P is the present value of $100,000 to be received two years from the pres-
ent time where the interest rate is 10 percent.
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"Should the net rents from Blackacre be taxed to A or B or to both in
some proportion?" Such a question is misleading because, in light of
the accepted result that where A owns the fee in Blackacre A is taxed
on the full amount of net rents from Blackacre as income, it suggests
that the income from Blackacre is to be identified only as the $10,000
rent from Blackacre, and that it is such rent that should be taxed either
to A or B or both in some proportion. Proper inquiry should focus on
the taxpayers, A and B, and elicit a response to the following: "To
what extent, if any, does A (or B) have realized gain attributable to his
property interest in Blackacre?" Or stated in another way: "To what
extent have the property rights of A (or B), under state law, with re-
spect to the use of Blackacre, given rise, over a given period of time, to
realized economic benefit to A (or B)?" The focus, then, is not merely
on the rents from Blackacre, but on all economic benefits which flow
from Blackacre, including the increase in value of the remainder.
Looking first at A, the owner of the two year term, we see that he has
received $10,000 in rent for year 1. Under our prior analysis, A's eco-
nomic gain attributable to his interest in year 1 is $1,000 since he has
paid $9,000 for that year's interest. In addition, A still has the right to
receive $10,000 rent for year 2. More importantly, A's right to receive
$10,000 at the end of year 2 is now (i.e., at the end of year 1) worth
about $9,000-i.e., about $1,000 more than it was worth at the begin-
ning of year 1. Thus, A's economic gain attributable to his property
interest in Blackacre during year I is approximately $2,000, $1,000
attributable to year 1 and $1,000 attributable to the increase in value of
his interest in year 2.
B has received none of the rent. He still, however, has his remainder
in fee. More importantly, again, B's remainder is now worth approxi-
mately $91,000, i.e., about $8,000 more than it was worth at the begin-
ning of year 1. Thus, B's economic gain attributable to his interest in
Blackacre during year 1 is approximately $8,000.
To say, however, that A's economic gain for year 1 is $2,000 and B's
economic gain is $8,000 is not to say that these amounts constitute
realized gain or "income" to A and B in year 1. A's economic gain has
two sources: (1) his receipt of $10,000 rent for year 1 and (2) the
increase in value of his right to receive $10,000 rent for year 2. Under
present law, A will be considered to have income only with respect to
his receipt of the $10,000 rent and then only to the extent that this
amount exceeds the amount which A paid for the right to the rent of
year 1. A will thus have income of approximately $1,000 for year 1. :
IIn our example, A has bought a two year term for years for S17,000. Proper
economic analysis indicates that A paid about $9,000 for year I and S8,000 for
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A will not be taxed on the increase in value (approximately $1,000) of
his right to receive $10,000 in year 2. It should be noted that this ele-
ment of A's gain is economically indistinguishable from the kind of gain
which is taxed as accrued interest income on an original issue discount
bond under section 1232 of the Code. Nevertheless, the principle of
section 1232 is not applied by the Code to A's situation and, in the
absence of a specific statutory provision taxing this element of A's gain,
it will not be taxed in year 1. The economic gain of B in year I is pre-
cisely the same kind of gain as is involved in the second element of A's
gain; i.e., the increase in the value of B's remainder is in the nature of
original issue discount income, but is not reached by section 1232 or
any other Code provision. It would seem, therefore, that it should es-
cape taxation for the same reason or reasons which protect A from
taxation on the second element of his gain.
Nevertheless, certain cases-" have required a taxpayer in B's position
to include in his income the amount of the rent paid to A for year 1
minus an amount equal to A's economic gain for year 1. In terms of
our example, this would require B to include in his income the $10,000
rent paid to A minus $2,000 (the measure of A's economic gain for
year 1). These cases, in other words, treat B as though he had bought
the entire fee simple paying $83,000 down and $17,000 from the pro-
ceeds of a purchase money mortgage loan to be paid out of the 100 per-
cent of the rent from the property for two years (i.e., $20,000).30 When
the $10,000 rent is paid to A in year 1, it is treated as having been re-
ceived by B as the owner of the fee (and thus his income) and as having
been paid by B to A as an $8,000 payment on the principal of the loan
and a $2,000 deductible interest payment on the loan of $17,000 in
year 1.31
What is crucial to note is that the effect of such cases is to tax B on
the increase in value of his remainder interest for year I, $8,000, and
thus to increase the amount which is taxed as income from Blackacre
year 2. For tax purposes, however, A will be allowed an allowance for amortiza-
tion which is analogous to the straight line method of depreciation (without sal-
vage value since A's intangible asset, i.e., the two year term, wastes completely).
Thus, A would probably be allowed an offset of only $8,500 rather than $9,000.
For the purposes of our discussion in the text we have ignored this distortion.
2. Bryant v. Comm'r, 399 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1968); Alstores Realty Corp., 46
T.C. 363 (1966).
30 The $20,000 will include about $3,000 in interest (more precisely, $2,645)
on the $17,000 principal of the loan (more precisely, $17,355).
31 More precisely, an interest figure of $1,736 on a loan of $17,355. Likewise,
the payment of $10,000 to A in year 2 is treated as a payment by B to A of $9,000
principal (more precisely, $9,091) and interest of $1,000 (more precisely, $909).
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from $1,000 to $9,000 ($1,000 to A and $8,000 to B).1 These cases
have thus given section 1232 treatment to B, albeit unwittingly as we
shall see, even though (1 ) that section only applies to original issue dis-
count corporate bonds and (2) there is no statutory provision corre-
sponding to section 1232 which would reach an "original issue discount
remainder" such as B's.:2 : Moreover, in extending section 1232 treat-
ment to B, these cases have resulted in discrimination between a tax-
payer like B in our example who has an original issue discount remain-
der in fee and a taxpayer like A in our situation who has an original
issue discount remainder for a term of years. It will be recalled that
although A's economic gain at the end of year 1 was $2,000, A is taxed
only on $1,000 due to $10,000 rent paid to him at the end of year 1. A
is not taxed on the $1,000 increase in value for year 1 of his remainder
interest, i.e., his right to receive $ 10,000 at the end of year 2. Yet, as
we have pointed out, this element of A's gain is indistinguishable from
the $8,000 gain in B's remainder in fee, and there would thus seem to
be no justification for taxing B on the increase in value of his remainder
interest if A's identical gain is not also taxed."
In order to determine the propriety of the recent decisions which have
taxed B on the increase in value we will analyze the development by the
Supreme Court of the income tax theory applicable to temporally di-
12 It should be noted that if there were an actual loan transaction A would be
required to report $2,000 as income, and thus S 10,000 in the aggregate would be
reported by A and B as income. Indeed, in such a transaction, even if interest is
not stated, the theory of section 483 is to require a pro rata inclusion by A and
deduction by B. (Cf. Example 4 of section 1.483-1(d) (4) of the regulations,
where, in a stated interest situation, the interest is not prorated but is treated (in
terms of our example) as paid 1 in year 1 and 2 in year 2.)
Where, however, as in our example, no actual loan has been made by A to B
and A has merely purchased years 1 and 2 from C. the situation from A's point
of view is no different from one where A purchased year I for S9,000 and an-
other party purchased year 2 for $8,000. In such a case, no matter how B is
treated, A would only have $1,000 of taxable income on receipt of S10,000 for
year 1.
I Indeed, there was a long standing dispute, prior to the 1969 amendments to
section 1232, as to whether the original issue discount of a bond was taxable to
even an accrual basis taxpayer prior to sale or redemption of the bond. See United
States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54 and n.4 (1965). For a history of the
dispute see the opinion of the district court in 214 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Ohio
1963) (Kalbfleisch, J.). And see Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 and n.1
(1965). See also the opinion of the district court in Dlxon, 224 F. Supp. 358, 365
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
" Nor is it an answer that A will be required to report this element of his gain
when he receives the $10,000 rent at the end of year 2. for if B were not taxed
on the increase in value of his remainder interest in year I or year 2, he likewise
would be taxed on such gain if and when he disposed of the fee simple.
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vided (present versus future) interests in income producing property.
We shall also consider those provisions of the Code through which Con-
gress has spoken to the problem at diverse times and in discrete areas.
Finally, we will consider the propriety of taxing B on the increase in
value of his remainder in light of the method of taxation accepted by
the courts and the Congress where there is no temporal division of inter-
ests, i.e., where the fee to Blackacre is owned by a single taxpayer.
Genesis of Economic Benefit (or Risk) Analysis
Burnet v. Whitehouse
In the 1931 decision of Burnet v. Whitehouse,35 the Supreme Court
held a legatee of a fixed dollar annuity, payable in all events, was not an
income beneficiary of the estate since the payment of the annuity did
not depend on the presence of income. Thus, according to the Court,
the annuitant had nothing to lose from the absence of income-had no
risk of loss with respect to income-hence received no economic benefit
from it, and could not be taxed as a recipient of income. Although
couched in different terms, the risk analysis corresponds exactly to the
economic benefit analysis set forth above. In other words, the presence
of economic benefit depends upon the presence of risk of loss, and is a
direct function of such risk. One is the economic owner (beneficiary)
of an item only if it is his not only to receive, but also to lose if it fails
to materialize. Thus, in Whitehouse, the recipient of a trust annuity had
no economic interest in trust income, and could not be taxed on trust
income despite the fact that his annuity was satisfied from trust income.
Since the annuity was also a charge on trust corpus, to the extent corpus
was present the annuity did not depend on the presence of income and
hence bore no risks with respect to income. Hence, the annuitant was
the economic beneficiary only of corpus, and it was the remainderman
who bore the risks of income, and who, therefore, was the income bene-
ficiary in the economic sense.
Whitehouse, then, can be seen as involving an AB situation with the
named trust remainderman recast as A, the income beneficiary, and the
annuitant recast as B, the beneficial owner of the remainder interest. It
was as though the testator had bequeathed Blackacre, value $100,000,
to the annuitant, B, to be paid at the end of one year, with the annual
rentals from Blackacre ($10,000) to be paid to A at year's end. At
11 Burnet v. Whitehouse, 283 U.S. 148 (1931), followed in Helvering v. Butter-
worth, 290 U.S. 365 (1933).
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testator's death, therefore, B had the right to receive S100,000 at the
end of one year. This right was worth about $91,000. A's right at
testator's death was to receive $10,000 at the end of one year. This
right was then worth about $9,000. When, at the end of one year B
received Blackacre, value $100,000, and A received S 10,000 of rents,
B had economic gain of $9,000 and A had economic gain of S 1,000.
In Whitehouse, the controlling statute provided that a bequest of
property was exempt from income tax, but that income from property
was not exempt. The Court had already decided, in Jriin v. Gavit,:
that the statute did not exempt a bequest of an income interest in prop-
erty even though such a bequest had a present value (and hence could
be viewed as property). Thus, Gavit taxed A on his gain from the re-
ceipt of $10,000 in rentals. B, however, was seen as having received
only exempt property, not income from property, and so had no taxable
income. This result for B is analytically supportable for the value of
Blackacre when inherited by B, i.e., $91,000. This was exempt property
within the statute and so was not taxable income to B. Also not taxed
to B, however, was the $9,000 increase in value of Blackacre for the
year. The Court did not discuss this issue. The $9,000 gain to B appears
to have been either unperceived by all, or not seen as an item of taxable
income.
The proper treatment of this item to B-including the effect of sec-
tions 102, 273, 1014 and 1015 where B takes by gratuitous transfer-
is, of course, the major burden of this article and will be developed in
the ensuing discussion. Suffice it to say at this point that Whitehouse
refused to tax B, the annuitant (remainderman), on amounts of income
(rentals) as to which A alone bore the risk of loss.
Palmer v. Bender and Thomas v. Perkins
The connection between economic benefit and risk of loss was again
made by the Court when it turned to the question of allowance of the
depletion deduction in the oil and gas cases. In Palmer v. Bender,' A
was the lessee under oil and gas leases and assigned his interest to B,
receiving a cash bonus and retaining both a production payment and an
overriding royalty. The Commissioner refused to allow depletion deduc-
tions to A on the ground that A had sold his interest in the assigned
leases and therefore no longer owned any interest in the oil."s The Court,
36268 U.S. 161 (1925).
-1 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
"s Id. at 554.
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however, held for the taxpayer stating that the depletion allowance "does
not depend upon his retention of ownership or any particular form of
legal interest in the mineral content of the land. It is enough if, by
virtue of the leasing transaction, he has retained a right to share in the
oil produced. If so, he has an economic interest in the oil in place,
which is depleted by production." "
The Court's emphasis is upon the retained production payment as the
vehicle for A's recovery of his capital. A necessary corollary of this
emphasis is that lack of, or an insufficient amount of, oil production
would result in A losing part or all of his capital investment. Thus, A
has not sold his interest because he has retained the risk of loss of his
capital. The Court alluded to this risk: "The loss or destruction of the
oil at any time from the date of the leases until complete extraction
would have resulted in loss to the partnerships. Such an interest is, we
think, included within the meaning and purpose of the statute permitting
... a reasonable allowance for depletion ....
Palmer, and cases which later refined its principle," established the
basic principle that retention of the risks of production was the retention
of an economic interest. In terms of Whitehouse, that retention of the
risk of loss from nonproduction of oil identifies the economic bene-
ficiary of the income from oil production.
The holding of Palmer-that A was entitled to the depletion allow-
ance-was applied in Perkins" to prevent taxation of B on amounts re-
ceived by A from oil production. A had owned oil and gas leases on
undeveloped lands and had assigned the leases to B for $155,000 in cash
and notes and a $395,000 production payment to be paid to A solely
from oil produced, without any personal liability on the part of B. The
Commissioner included in B's income amounts paid to A in discharge
of the production payment and allowed B depletion on those amounts.
" Id. at 557. An additional requirement imposed by the Court was that the
taxpayer have acquired his interest in the oil by investment. Ibid. There has been
much litigation on the meaning of this requirement. See Helvering v. Bankline
Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938); Scofield v. La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 268 F.2d
699 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 933 (1960). Compare Comm'r v.
Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956); Coleman v. United States, 388
F.2d 337 (Ct. CI. 1967); Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d 393 (Ct.
C1. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 981 (1967); CBN Corp. v. United States, 328
F.2d 316 (Ct. Cl. 1964). There is no need for this article to discuss this problem
since we are not concerned with A being allowed the depletion allowance, but only
an allowance for any cost he has in the property.
40 287 U.S. at 558.
41 Comm'r v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1955): Burton-Sutton
Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 328 U.S. 25 (1946); Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Cornm'r, 326
U.S. 599 (1946).
42 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
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The Court held that the assignment from A to B did not transfer the oil
in question; ownership of the oil remained with A under Palmer. Hence,
A included the production payment as income, subject to a depletion
allowance, and no part of A's receipts were chargeable to B.
The reasoning of the Court in Perkins expressly made the tax result
for B turn directly upon the tax consequences to A." Since A's pro-
duction payment was a reserved interest in the oil, A did not sell and B
did not buy that oil, and the income is A's, not B's. In short, A is viewed
as having retained an ownership interest in the value of the property
represented by the production payment, and as having sold the remain-
der of the property, payment for which is not dependent upon produc-
tion.4" These are, of course, the ingredients of the classic ABC trans-
action whereby A could sell the remainder to B and the production pay-
3 The dissent in Perkins by Justices Stone and Cardozo argued that the income
was B's, and that the tax consequences to A, i.e., the issues of capital gains and
depletion, were irrelevant to the issue of how to tax B. 301 U.S. at 663. The posi-
tion of the dissent is interesting in that it seems to deny the existence of a rela-
tionship between what interest A has sold and that which B has purchased. Or,
perhaps the dissent viewed the transaction as a sale by A of his entire interest in
the oil, with the retained production payment essentially equivalent to a purchase
money mortgage lien on the production income. See Hambrick, Another Look
at Some Old Problems-Percentage Depletion and the ABC Transaction, 34 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1965). This latter view is the one eventually adopted by Con-
gress in 1969 when it enacted section 636(b) of the Code.
4Perkins did not deal with the issue of whether A had engaged in a sale of the
portion of his interest for which he received the down payment of S155,000 in
cash and notes. In Palner the Court had held that both a retained production
payment and the cash bonus were retained economic interests, subject to the
depletion allowance. Also, in Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932), the Court
denied capital gain treatment to a cash bonus received by the lessor of an oil and
gas lease. Because of the heavy reliance placed upon Palmer, the Court in Per-
kins, although it discussed only the oil payment, may well have considered the
cash bonus also to be controlled by Pahner. But, this is not an entirely fair reading
of Perkins because in both Palmer and Burnet v. Harnei, the assignor had not
only received a cash bonus, but also had retained an overriding royalty measured
by production over the life of the lease, while in Perkins no such royalty interest
was retained. When the issue was raised squarely in the lower courts, where no
overriding royalty was retained by A it was held that the cash payment was re-
ceived by A for an interest sold, hence, the cash was not subject to depletion,
while the production payment was an interest reserved by A for which the de-
pletion allowance was proper. Palmer and Burnet v. Hartnel have been distin-
guished on the ground that lack of an overriding royalty prevented treatment of
the cash as an advance royalty or bonus. Comm'r v. Cullen, 118 F.2d 651 (5th
Cir. 1941); Columbia Oil & Gas Co. v. Comm'r, 118 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1941);
Hammonds v. Comm'r, 106 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1939); Comm'r v. Fleming, 82
F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1936). See also G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214, 217, 224.
Cf. MacLean v. Comm'r, 120 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1941). The net result of this
interpretation of Perkins is that B is not taxable on the income received by A in
discharge of the production payment; A gets exchange gain from the sale of the
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ment to C, at capital gains.45 C has no net income beyond interest and
B will eventually acquire the fee without having been taxed on the pro-
duction payment. Most importantly, although under Perkins B cannot
be taxed on A's income, neither, as in Whitehouse, was B taxed on his
own economic gain, i.e., the annual amount of the increase in value of
his remainder interest due to the passage of time. Again, this issue was
not discussed by the Court.
Erosion of Economic Benefit (or Risk) Analysis
Clay Brown Case
In Commissioner v. Brown,4" A owned stock in a corporation which
operated a lumber milling business. He conveyed the stock to B, a tax-
exempt charity, in return for $5,000 down from the assets of the corpo-
ration and B's promise to pay him $1.3 million solely out of 72 percent
of the operating profits of the business, without personal liability. The
obligation to pay was secured by a mortgage on the corporate assets.
The agreement between A and B also provided that B would liquidate
the corporation and lease its assets to an operating company (Fortuna
Sawmills, Inc.) and that A was to be employed by Fortuna under a
management contract.
The pertinence of Clay Brown to this article lies mainly in the Court's
analysis of Perkins and Anderson v. Helvering.47
Commissioner's Argument
The Commissioner initially argued before the Supreme Court that the
liquidation of the corporation should be disregarded and that the trans-
portion sold for immediate cash (Howard Glenn, 39 T.C. 427 (1962); G.C.M.
22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214, 217) and ordinary income on amounts received in dis-
charge of the retained production payment, or exchange gain if he also sells the
production payment to another party. I.T. 4003, 1950-1 C.B. 10; United States
v. Wittee, 306 F.2d 81, 88 (5th Cir. 1962) (dictum), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 949
(1963); I.T. 4003, 1950-1 C.B. 10, declared obsolete in Rev. Rul. 70-277,
1970-1 C.B. 280.
" This, of course, is aside from depreciation recapture provisions such as sec-
tions 1245 and 1250.
46380 U.S. 563 (1965).
7 310 U.S. 404 (1940). For more general discussions of bootstrap sales to
charitable organizations, see, e.g., Hall, The Clay Brown Case and Related Prob-
lems, 1966 S. CALIF. INST. 337;' Van Cleave III, The Bootstraps Sale Of A Busi-
ness-As Seen By The Taxpayer, The Commissioner, And The Supreme Court,
15 KAN. L. REV. 166 (1966); Kinsey, Bootstraps and Capital Gain-A Partici-
pant's View Of Commissioner v. Clay Brown, 64 MICH. L. REV. 581 (1966);
Lanning, Tax Erosion and the "Bootstrap Sale" of a Business-, 108 U. PA. L.
REV. 623 (1960).
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action should be recast as a transfer by A of his corporate stock in ex-
change for notes of $1.3 million and B's obligation to remit to A 72
percent of all dividends paid on the stock in payment of the notes, with
the stock pledged to secure payments on the notes.4 The Commissioner
argued in the alternative that if the corporate liquidation was to be given
tax effect, then the liquidation was ( 1) a tax-free liquidation to B under
sections 332 and 501 (c) (3), which changed A's interest from a retained
interest in corporate stock to an interest in corporate assets, acquired
in a nontaxable transaction and hence still retained ',; or (2) under the
step transaction doctrine, since the liquidation was a preplanned part
of an integrated transaction, the whole transaction amounted to a liqui-
dation of the corporation by A (requiring him to recognize his capital
gains immediately under section 331 and acquire a fair market value
basis in the assets under section 334(a) ) and a conveyance of the assets
to B in return for 72 percent of the income from the assets.-
Whatever view is taken as to the substance of the transaction, argued
the Commissioner, the amounts received by A after the liquidation are
due to a retained interest in the assets and hence are ordinary income,
subject to basis offset by way of amortization of basis in a wasting
asset.51
I This argument proceeds, of course, from Perkins. Since A has the
risk of loss with respect to the assets producing sufficient income to dis-
charge the note, A necessarily has not sold the assets but has merely
retained the income interest up to $1.3 million and conveyed only the
remainder beyond $1.3 million. Hence, B cannot be taxed on such in-
come as it gives him no economic benefit - and A must be taxed on
these amounts as ordinary income, subject to amortization.'
The Commissioner also argued that the $1.3 million purchase price
was presumptively in excess of the fair market value of the stock con-
veyed in order to compensate A for retaining the risk of loss,5' but not
so excessively high as to invoke the no sale result of Kolkey v. Commis-
4sBrief for Petitioner at 29, Comm'r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965). The
purpose of so recasting the transaction, argued the Commissioner, was to disre-
gard the liquidation of the corporation by B and the transfer of the assets to
Fortuna as irrelevant to the transaction since the sole function of those events was
to eliminate the corporate income tax on the original corporation, obtain a rent
deduction for Fortuna and utilize B's tax-exempt status. Brief for Petitioner at 28.
49Reply Brief for Petitioner at 24.
50 Id. at 21-24.
z' Id. at 12-20.
5 Brief for Petitioner at 43.
53Id. at 43-49; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 14-18.
"Brief for Petitioner at 30-38.
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sioner.5" Thus, argued the Commissioner, A not only has retained the
risk of loss up to the fair market value of the stock conveyed, but has
also retained the right to share in income production or appreciation of
the stock in the future, i.e., beyond the fair market value of the stock10
Opinion of the Court
The Supreme Court effectively defused the Commissioner's argument
with respect to excessive purchase price by relying on the Tax Court's
finding that the price was within "reasonable limits based on the earnings
and net worth of the company," and on the failure of the Commissioner
to offer proof on the point.7 But if we assume the Commissioner was
correct with regard to his suggestion of an excessive price, what are the
merits of this argument? If the point is that gain from the sale of an
asset is limited to appreciation present in the asset at the time of the
sale,"8 then only so much of the gain as is attributable to an excessive
purchase price can be seen as not arising from the sale of the asset. To
argue, on this ground, that all of the gain arises from a retained interest
is a clear case of overkill. Perhaps sensing this, the Commissioner aban-
doned his argument about excessive price in his reply brief, 9 a fact not
alluded to by the Court, and relied only on the risk of loss notion of
Perkins."0
The response of the Court to Perkins was essentially twofold. The
first response is very difficult to discern. Justice White began by reiter-
ating a previous statement of the Court that "Congress . . . has recog-
nized the peculiar character of the business of extracting natural re-
sources." 61
But the essence of the Court's first response apparently is to be found
in the curious juxtaposition of the following two sentences:
5 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958); see Brief for Petitioner at 33, Comm'r v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
5 Brief for Petitioner at 36-38.
380 U.S. at 573. The Court also referred to the fact that the charity's in-
come tax exemption permitted it a faster payout, although the Court did not show
the connection between this fact and the possibility of an excessive price. As we
will see, the higher payout permits a higher price than a taxable buyer could pay.
But, as we will also see, a seller in such case may trade some or all of such excess
in price for a faster payout, which is apparently what happened in Clay Brown.
11 A point made by the Commissioner. Brief for Petitioner at 59-61, Comm'r
v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
19 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 7-12.
60 Id. at 8-9.
61 380 U.S. at 575.
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Percentage depletion allows an arbitrary deduction to compensate for ex-
haustion of the asset, regardless of cost incurred or any investment which
the taxpayer may have made. The Commissioner, however, would assess
to respondents as ordinary income the entire amount of all rental pay-
ments made by the Institute, regardless of the accumulated values in the
corporation which the payments reflected and without regard for the present
policy of the tax law to allow the taxpayer to realize on appreciated values
at the capital gains rates. 62
This first response seems really to consist of two points. One is that in
the oil cases the taxpayer is allowed a tax-free recovery beyond cost by
the allowance for percentage depletion, whereas the Commissioner is
trying to tax the taxpayer in Clay Brown without allowing any cost re-
covery. But this is clearly a misstatement since the Commissioner, as
pointed out in the opinion of the Tax Court,4 was trying to tax only the
amounts above the basis of the stock, allowing amortization of such
basis against the payments received.
The serious point of this first response seems to be that the Commis-
sioner's position violates "the policy of the tax law to allow the taxpayer
to realize on appreciated values at the capital gains rates.""' But this
is surely question begging by the Court since a taxpayer may clearly
realize on appreciated value and still be taxed at ordinary income rates.
If, e.g., A buys Blackacre (for $100,000) with an annual rental value
of $10,000, and the rental value appreciates over the years to $20,000,
the value of Blackacre thus appreciates from $100,000 to $200,000,
and if A continues to rent at $20,000 he will be taxed on the entire
amount as ordinary income "regardless of the accumulated [value]
which the payments reflected." 6'
The question begged by the Court was whether there had been a "con-
version of a capital investment.""' As the Court had said in Anderson,
quoted often by Justice White in Clay Brown:
The sole owner and operator of oil properties clearly has a capital invest-
ment in the oil in place, if anyone has, and so is taxable on the gross pro-
ceeds of production and is granted" a deduction from gross income as com-
pensation for the consumption of his capital. See Burnet v. Harmel, supra,
at 107-108; Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331. By an outright sale of
his interest for cash, such an owner converts the form of his capital invest-
ment, severs his connection with the production of oil and gas and the in-
come derived from production, and thus renders inapplicable to his situ-
02 Id. at 576.
- 37 T.C. 461, 482 (1961).
6 380 U.S. at 576.65 Ibid.
6 See Comm'r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 265 (1958).
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ation the reasons for the depletion allowance. "The words 'gross income
from the property,' as used in the statute governing the allowance for de-
pletion, mean gross income received from the operation of the oil and gas
wells by one who has a capital investment therein,-not income from the
sale of the oil and gas properties themselves." Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land
Co., 303 U.S. 372, 375-376.6'
Thus, the two points made by the Court in its first response to Perkins
will not really stand analysis. The second response, however, is worthy
of more attention: That response, stated simply, was that Anderson
dictates sale treatment for Clay Brown because there was a mortgage on
the property sold. As the Court states: "The respondent in this case,
of course, not only had rights against income, but if the income failed
to amount to $250,000 in any two consecutive years, the entire amount
could be declared due, which was secured by a lien on the real and per-
sonal properties of the company." 13
8
Anderson v. Helvering
Suppose A owns Blackacre, value of $1 0OX, and A sells to B only a
remainder interest, A reserving the right to the first $20X of rents, which
right has a value of $17X. B pays A $83X for the remainder. Under
Perkins, B will not include rents received by A during the two year term
and B's basis in his interest remains at $83X. If, however, B gives A a
mortgage pledging his remainder interest as security for A receiving the
first $20X of rents, Anderson holds that B must include the $20X rents
in his income." ' A no longer has the risk of loss with respect to the
$20X of rents-i.e., A is not solely dependent upon the rents in order
to be paid $20X, hence, A has sold to B the entire fee for $1 OOX plus
$3X of interest, and B gets the economic benefit of the $20X paid to A
from rentals. Why does the presence of the mortgage on B's remainder
interest change the result of Perkins and give B the benefit of payments
received by A? Because the payments received by A remove the burden
of an obligation encumbering B's separate property-, (the remainder
interest), hence, they enrich B by the amount of the payments. The situ-
ation is the same, says Anderson, as if B had pledged his own personal
liability to make the payments to A. The rentals received by A benefit
07i310 U.S. at 408-409.
6s 380 U.S. at 577 (footnote omitted).
310 U.S. 404 (1939). $17X presumably would increase B's basis in Black-
acre to $100X and $3X would be deductible by B as interest.
7 See discussion in Christie v. United States, 436 F.2d 1216, 1220-221 (5th
Cir. 1971); cf. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Comm'r, 465 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1972).
11310 U.S. at 413.
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B by discharging his liability and freeing up the value of his separate
assets.
So viewed, Anderson is simply an application of the principles of
Crane v. Commissioner"2 (on sale of property subject to a mortgage,
the face amount of the mortgage is part of the transferor's amount re-
alized), United States v. Kirby Lumber Co."' and Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner74 (the discharge of one's obligation is equivalent
to receipt by the obligor). These tax benefit principles are viable, how-
ever, only to the extent that B has assets of his own which are burdened
by the obligation to pay A $20X in rentals. If the security provided by
B is $20X of escrowed cash, or property other than Blackacre with a
value substantially above $20X, then there is a clear burden on B's cash
or other assets which is removed by payment of the rents to A. There
is no reason to treat such cases differently from a sale by A to B for
$100X in cash or property, with B then keeping 100 percent of the
rentals for himself. When, however, the security provided by B is a
mortgage on the remainder in Blackacre, the very same property con-
veyed by A, without any personal liability on B for the $20X, does a
different result obtain? The Court was faced with, and decided, this
precise problem, in Anderson. There, A reserved the right to receive (to
use the numbers of our example) $20X payable from oil produced by
the oil properties sold to B. A also retained a "first lien and claim
against [the] 'oil and gas production and fee interest.., from which the
[$20X] was payable.' "7 One of the arguments relied on by the govern-
ment for the proposition that there had been a sale was that "[A] had a
first lien and claim against .. the oil and gas production and fee in-
terest." 76 As an example of "[s]everal of the distinctions urged upon
us by the Government [which] are without substance," the Court stated
"[t]he retention of a lien, if it were construed as a lien only upon the oil
and gas production, and nothing more, would not make [A] any the less
dependent upon such production for the amounts reserved." 7" But, said
the Court:
The reservation of an interest in the fee, in addition to the interest in the
oil production .. materially affects the transaction. [A] is not dependent
entirely upon the production of oil for the deferred payments; they may
be derived from sales of the fee title to the land conveyed.... We are of
-2331 U.S. 1 (1947).
33 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
r4279 U.S. 716 (1929).
75 310 U.S. at 406.
6Id. at 411.
,7 Id. at 412 (footnote omitted).
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opinion that the reservation of this additional type of security for the de-
ferred payments serves to distinguish this case from Thomas v. Perkins. It
is similar to the reservation in a lease of oil payment rights together with
a personal guarantee by the lessee that such payments shall at all events
equal the specified sum .... In the interests of a workable rule, Thomas
v. Perkins must not be extended beyond the situation in which, as a matter
of substance, without regard to the formalities of conveyancing, the re-
served payments are to be derived solely from the production of oil and
gas. The deferred payments reserved by [A], accordingly, must be treated
as payments received upon a sale to [B]." -8
In other words, where B, by paying something down, has purchased
a remainder interest and has pledged the entire fee as security for pay-
ment of the amounts to be received by A, B has burdened separate prop-
erty of his own (the remainder) and the income payments received by
A remove the burden of such obligation and thus are to be considered
as B's income from the property and payments to A from the sale of
the property. The fact that the burden is on a remainder (fee) interest
in the same property in which the present interest is retained does not
make it any less a burden on B's separate property."
7 Id. at 412-13 (emphasis added).
"DWhere the only separate asset mortgaged is B's remainder the income still
benefits B, even if after payment to A the principal of the debt remains larger
than the value of B's remainder, since the income used to pay off part of the debt
has decreased the burden on B's remainder. As is indicated in Anderson (where a
remainder purchased for $50,000 secured a debt of $110,000), it is not necessary
that the remainder mortgaged be equal to or greater than the amount of the debt.
Otherwise, such a transaction would constitute a sale only if there were the equiva-
lent of a 50 percent or higher down payment.
It would, however, appear logically necessary that the remainder mortgaged
have some independent value to B since otherwise it is hard to see how B could
be benefitted by the removal of a decreasing burden on such an interest or how
A could be said to have a meaningful security interest. In fact, a refined analysis
would require that each time an income payment was made to A, B's remainder
be valued and A's payment be considered income to B only to the extent of the
value of B's remainder at that time. In this respect, however, it is important to
recall that Anderson distinguished Perkins with the following statement: "In the
interests of a workable rule, Thomas v. Perkins must not be extended beyond the
situation in which, as a matter of substance, without regard to formalities of con-
veyancing, the reserved payments are to be derived solely from the production
of oil and gas." 310 U.S. at 413. This is tantamount to saying that where a
mortgage is retained on the (remainder in) fee of the property sold, some value
in the remainder will be presumed, thus, only where the price clearly exceeds the
fair market value of the property will the lien or the fee be disregarded and sale
treatment refused. See, e.g., Kolkey v. Comm'r, 254 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1958),
where, as the Supreme Court in Clay Brown characterized it, "the price was con-
sidered grossly excessive and the transaction a sham." 380 U.S. at 574 n.7.
Similar principles are applied where the sale question arises in the context of
whether to include an unassumed mortgage in basis for the purpose of deprecia-
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Nor is it relevant that the failure of A's present interest to generate
the reserved payments ($20X in our example) may be reflected in a
diminution of A's security in B's remainder. Such a possibility differs
only in degree from the situation where A receives a security interest in
assets other than those conveyed, since A always bears the risk that all
of B's assets could become worthless.
Relationship of Anderson v. Helvering to Clay Brown
In his concurring opinion in Clay Brown, Justice Harlan made the
following comment:
The force underlying the Government's position is that the respondents did
clearly retain some risk-bearing interest in the business. Instead of leaping
from this premise to the conclusion that there was no sale or exchange, the
Government might more profitably have broken the transaction into com-
ponents and attempted to distinguish between the interest which respon-
dents retained and the interest which they exchanged. The worth of a
business depends upon its ability to produce income over time. What re-
spondents gave up was not the entire business, but only their interest in
the business' ability to produce income in excess of that which was neces-
sary to pay them off under the terms of the transaction. The value of such
a residual interest is a function of the risk element of the business and the
amount of income it is capable of producing per year, and will necessarily
be substantially less than the value of the total business.""
These observations not only properly characterize the Clay Brown
transaction but also permit us to discuss it in terms of our AB hypo-
thetical analyzed previously. In terms of that example, the charity in
Clay Brown is B, Clay Brown is A and the stock is Blackacre, worth
$100,000. A has conveyed to B a future interest (remainder in fee) in
Blackacre and has retained a present interest, i.e., the right to be paid
$100,000 from the rent of Blackacre with interest on the outstanding
tion. See Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); David F. Bolger, 59 T.C. 760
(1973); Mayerson, 47 T.C. 340 (1966); Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969-1 C.B. 59 (ac-
quiescing in Mayerson "on the particular facts" and indicating that the Service
will disallow depreciation where "the transactions were designed to create or in-
flate depreciation deductions").
The workable rule applied in the above contexts is a practical necessity since
its alternative would require the continuous investigation of the sufficiency of all
security in credit sales, with or without personal (i.e.. general asset) liability.
Although such a rule may have some logical support, its practical problems are
prohibitive. Moreover, such a rule would logically lead to further rules equally
impractical, e.g., the owner of a fee simple could be taxed on the rent from such
property only if the fee maintained its value so that the rent was an accurate
measure of the gain.
SO 380 U.S. at 580-81.
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balance."' Now if we assume, as in prior hypotheses, that Blackacre
has, and will continue to have, an annual rent of $10,000, it becomes
apparent that B's remainder is worth nothing at the beginning of year 1
and will continue to be worth nothing at the end of year 1. This is be-
cause, at the assumed prevailing interest rate of 10 percent, the rent
will exactly equal the interest due on the outstanding balance, thus, B's
future interest (the remainder) will not have made any advance toward
becoming a present interest, i.e., it will not have increased in value. 82
However, the charity in the Clay Brown case, although it paid nothing
down for its future interest,83 was in a different position from B in our
hypothetical because it was a tax-exempt B. Thus, it was able to make
payment of the purchase price in larger amounts than a taxable B. As-
sume, e.g., that Blackacre, worth $100,000, has pretax annual income
of about $20,000. If B is not taxed on that $20,000 because B is tax
exempt, the full $20,000 may be paid to A instead of, say, only about
$10,000 after corporate income tax. Thus, the tax-exempt B can afford
to pay a higher price than a taxable B. Theoretically, B could afford a
price of $200,000, but, in such case, if the property continued to yield
$20,000 net rent, the remainder of even a tax-exempt B would be worth
nothing at the outset and continue to be worth nothing because the rent
would only meet the interest payment. If, on the other hand, the tax-
exempt B were to pay only the same price as a taxable B, i.e., $100,000
(at 10 percent interest), it would, at $20,000 a year, be able to pay
that amount in about seven years. 4 Stated another way, B at the very
outset would have the right to get the property in about seven years and
11 In Clay Brown the charity was to keep 8 percent of the profits and the opcr-
ating company was to keep 20 percent of the profits. To that extent, therefore,
Clay Brown had transferred present interests. For our purposes, however, we can
ignore those facts and presume that Clay Brown was to be paid out of 100 per-
cent of the profits.
12 If we presume a permanent return of $10,000 and a permanent interest rate
of 10 percent, B's remainder will always be worth nothing, using the formula
(see N. 19 supra):
100
( + .1)OO
'Although the parties' agreement called for a $5,000 down payment, such
down payment was to be made out of the assets of the business. Thus, there was
really no down payment forthcoming from the charity, rather, $5,000 was merely
withheld from the sale.
84 Generalizing, on the assumption of a continuing level of rent and continuing
rate of interest, the lower the price (i.e., the closer the price to that which a non-
exempt buyer would pay ($100,000)), the shorter the payout period at $20,000,
the higher the price, the longer the payout period.
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would thus at the outset have the equivalent of a remainder in fee worth
$100,000.:5
What does this say with respect to the relationship of Anderson to
Clay Brown? First of all, it seems clear that the tax-exempt charity in
Clay Brown did have, from the outset, a remainder of some value. This
can be inferred from the finding that the negotiated price was within a
reasonable range combined with the faster payout due to the income tax
exemption of the charity. As Justice Harlan pointed out in his concur-
ring opinion: "The Code gives the Institute a tax exemption which
makes it capable of taking a greater after-tax return from a business
than could a non tax-exempt individual or corporation. Respondents
traded a residual interest in their business for a faster payout apparently
made possible by the Institute's exemption." 1
Since the taxpayers in Clay Brown had a mortgage lien on the real
and personal properties of Clay Brown and Company and since that
lien extended not just to the production of $1.3 million of those prop-
erties, but, as in Anderson, extended as well to the fee interest in such
properties, the lien thus covered the residual or remainder interest which
the charity had from the outset.
If this is so, was not Clay Brown merely an application of the rule
established in Anderson that a sale occurs when the risk of loss has been
shifted by virtue of the seller's ability to realize payments on the pur-
chase price from an independent asset of the buyer? Using the figures
of our hypothetical, in year I when $20,000 of rents are paid to A from
Blackacre, shouldn't that be considered income to B under Anderson
and Whitehouse, since it benefits B by preserving B's independent asset,
i.e., the remainder? Conversely, should not the $20,000 1- paid to A be
I This figure comes about by the modification of one of the variables in the
normal discount formula where a tax-exempt entity is involved. If, as we have
assumed, Blackacre will continue to have pretax rent of $20,000 and the interest
rate will continue to be 10 percent, then the value of Blackacre to a tax-exempt
entity is $200,000 (see application of formula
I
in N. 18 supra). Thus, using the discount formula applied in N. 19 supra
G +01)




s6 380 U.S. at 580.
87 An interest payment would be $10,000, i.e., 10 percent of the outstanding
balance of $100,000 for year 1.
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considered payment from the sale since A is not solely dependent on
the earnings of the property for the payment of the $20,000, having an
additional source, i.e., B's remainder, as in Anderson?
The answer to all of these questions is affirmative when the value of
the remainder is measured only by its value to a B which is exempt from
taxation, in this case, $100,000. The importance of Anderson, how-
ever, lies in measuring the value of the remainder as security to A and,
on our facts, immediately after the conveyance, the value of the remain-
der as security to A would be zero because its value to a nontax-exempt
buyer would be zero. However, this would be only a temporary phe-
nomenon, because after A receives $20,000 of income in the first year,
the principal due A would be reduced to $90,000 and the remainder
would have a value even to a nontax-exempt buyer."8
Viewed in the above fashion, Clay Brown involves a continuation,
not a rejection, albeit perhaps some erosion, of the risk benefit theory
of Anderson.
Effect of Clay Brown on AB Transaction
In General
Clay Brown, then, is properly analyzed as a conveyance of a remain-
der interest from A to B, with A reserving a production payment secured
by a mortgage on the remainder. So viewed, the risks of payout to A
are borne by B to the extent of the value of the remainder, and Clay
Brown is supported by Anderson. The lower courts, however, have not
clearly perceived Clay Brown as an AB case with a mortgage and have
"Suppose, however, that the price were $200,000 to a tax-exempt buyer, prin-
cipal and interest to be paid with $20,000 a year. In such a case, a remainder
of value to the tax-exempt buyer would be created if the price carried an interest
rate lower than the earning rate of the property (e.g., if in our hypothesis the
price was $200,000 payable out of $20,000 annual earnings and the interest on
the outstanding balance was only, say, 5 percent, rather than 10 percent).
But such a remainder would not qualify as an independent asset under Ander-
son, even after A received $20,000 of income in the first year, since the remainder
at that point would still have no value to a nontax-exempt buyer and, therefore,
no value to A as security. This is true even though, from B's point of view, the
payment to A of $20,000 ($10,000 interest and $10,000 payment of principal)
has had the effect of removing $10,000 of the encumbrance on the fee which to
B is worth $200,000 (due to his tax-exempt status).
On facts similar to those discussed in this footnote, the Second Circuit in Beren-
son v. Commissioner, 507 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1974), held that there was a sale
in the amount of the fair market value of the property, specifically confining the
determination of fair market value to a market of nontax-exempt buyers. On the
basis of Anderson and Perkins, however, there was no sale at all in Berenson
until such time as the remainder of the tax-exempt buyer had a value in the
market of nontax-exempt buyers so as to represent security to A.
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applied it in situations which are not within the ambit of Anderson. In
so doing, they have disregarded the doctrine of Perkins.
We are concerned here with cases where A conveys property to B for
a cash consideration together with a limited right to the income from
the property.s9 Typical of such cases are Bryant v. Commissioner,"
Boone v. United States,9' Alstores Realty Corp.,'2 Kreusel v. United
States93 and Raymond L. Allen."4
In Bryant, A owned farming property which he desired to sell for
$1,175,500. A accepted B's offer to transfer the land to B for cash
together with a production payment of $250,000, plus interest on the
outstanding balance, payable to A from the farm crops, lease rentals
and water use payments. B undertook no personal liability for the pro-
duction payment, nor was the payment secured by a mortgage on any
asset. The Court held B to be taxable on amounts paid to A in satis-
faction of the production payment, citing three factors to make what
the Court described as a "factual determination." " A sale of the entire
fee, rather than a sale only of the remainder, was effected by A because
the production payment was limited to a specific amount, the duration
of the payments was for a short term and interest was payable on the
unpaid balance, indicating that the entire amount was B's debt to A ."
In so holding, the Court distinguished Perkins, quoting from Clay
Brown that Perkins "does not have unlimited sweep," ' -, but failing to
note that Clay Brown used this language in distinguishing Perkins in
favor of Anderson due to the presence of a mortgage."
On facts similar to those in Bryant, Boone v. United States found a
sale relying on the three factors cited in Bryant, and more generally on
the findings approved in Clay Brown with respect to arm's length bar-
gaining and a purchase price within a reasonable range.'
In Alstores Realty, A owned real estate which it sold to B for
" Not discussed are those cases where the income payments to A are secured
within the meaning of Anderson, e.g., Gyro Engineering Corp. v. United States,
417 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1969); Pacific Coast Music Jobbers, Inc., 55 T.C. 866
(1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1972); Larry D. Hibler, 46 T.C. 663
(1966), affd per curianz, 383 F.2d 989 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 390 U.S. 949
(1967); cf., e.g., George H. Landreth, 50 T.C. 803 (1968).
90 399 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1968).
9- 470 F.2d 232 (10th Cir. 1972).
9246 T.C. 363 (1966).
93 63-2 U.S.T.C. 9714 (D. Minn. 1963).
434 T.C.M. 242 (1975).
399 F.2d at 805.
Id. at 805, 806.
9 I1d. at 803.
9s 380 U.S. at 576-77.
99 470 F.2d at 236.
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$750,000 cash together with the right to retain occupancy of a portion
of the premises for two and one half years, rent free. The transaction
was cast in the form of a conveyance of the fee and a leaseback to A
of the two and one half year term, rather than a conveyance of the
remainder and a reserved term. The Commissioner contended that B
had income of $250,000-the difference between the cash paid and the
value of the fee-in the nature of prepaid rent received from A under
the lease. B argued that the transaction was a sale of the fee and a lease-
back in form only; that the substance of the transaction was a sale only
of the remainder and a reserved term for years. The Court found for
the Commissioner on a variety of grounds:
(1) B agreed to supply and pay for utilities.
(2) A had only the rights of a lessee under a standard lease form
(inability to sublet or assign).
(3) Most important, if A lost occupancy of the premises by reason
of an act of God or fault of petitioner, B agreed to pay A 6 per
square foot per month of lost occupancy.
Thus, said the Court, B "bore the risks and burdens of ownership"100
during the lease term and was therefore taxable on the rental value of
the term. Although Perkins was mentioned as involving a "directly
analogous" problem,' the Tax Court dealt with the risk-benefit theory
only to the limited extent of B's risks with respect to A's loss of occu-
pancy, never noting that all other risks of the property producing a value
of $250,000 were on A. Anderson was not mentioned.
Kreusel v. United States is a pre-Clay Brown case involving facts
similar to Alstores Realty, except that A retained a life estate. The
Commissioner attempted to increase A's amount realized on the sale by
the value of the life estate, but the Court held the interest had been
retained, not sold and leased back. Persuasive to the Court was the
form of the transaction (the interest was measured by A's life) and the
fact that A had possession and control of the property for the term. The
conveyance provided that A was to pay utilities and B was responsible
for taxes, assessments and insurance. The utilities provision was termed
to be "lease like,"' but the burdens on B were held not to affect the
character of A's life estate; the parties created a "tailored" rather than a
"classic" life estate, explained the Court.', Perkins was not discussed.' 0 '
100 46 T.C. at 372.
101 Ibid.
102 63-2 U.S.T.C. 89,845 (D. Minn. 1963).
1o3 Id. at 89,848.
1"4 Compare on this point, and with Kreusel and Alstores Realty, McCulley
Ashlock, 18 T.C. 405 (1952).
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The most recent case dealing with Clay Brouw'n in the AB transaction
is Raymond L. Allen. The facts, somewhat simplified, are that A sold
stock of corporations which manufactured travel trailers and mobile
homes for the greater of $900,000 or two thirds of net profits from the
business for 15 years. B assumed personal liability for the stated pur-
chase price of $900,000 and this liability was secured by a mortgage on
the corporate assets. A year later, at a time when A was convinced the
minimum $900,000 price would be met, B was released from his per-
sonal liability. After four years, both A and B sold their respective
interests at a large profit.
The Tax Court held that A had engaged in a sale of stock to B and
was entitled to treat his gain as capital gains. The price was not un-
reasonably excessive, as contended by the Commissioner, but was "within
a reasonable range," and controlled by Clay Brown,I'5 especially when
viewed from the hindsight of B being able to sell his interest for almost
$2 million.10 6
The Commissioner also urged the inapplicability of Clay Brown be-
cause the purchase price was not fixed, but was contingent on earn-
ings.0 7 Relying on Burnet v. Logan ,, and other variable price cases,
especially the tax cases in the patent field and section 1235, the Tax
Court found that a price based on future productivity is consistent with
a sale.109
-oi 34 T.C.M. 242 (1975).
'aoId. at 257-58.1
'
7 Id. at 255.
9 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
1o9 34 T.C.M. at 259-60. The cases in the patent area where the question was
whether the transfer of patent rights constituted a sale or a license were heavily
influenced by the Supreme Court's decisions in Waterman v. MacKenzie, 138
U.S. 252 (1891), and Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152 (1889). There, the Court
was faced with the issue of what was an assignment (sale) versus a license since
only an assignee was permitted to sue for infringement. The Court decided the
issue solely on the extent of the rights transferred to the transferee to make, sell
and use products covered by the patent. Nothing turned on economic risk shifting
since the question of who benefitted by the income was not deemed relevant. In
Rude v. Westcott, the Court stated: "The concluding provision, that the net
profits arising from sales, royalties, or settlements, or other source, are to be
divided between the parties to the assignment so as to give the patentee one fourth
thereof, does not, in any respect, modify or limit the absolute transfer of title. It
is a provision by which the consideration for the transfer is to be paid to the
grantor out of the net profits made." 130 U.S. at 162-63.
When the sale issue arose in tax cases, these infringement decisions were held
to be controlling; therefore, again there was no discussion of the tax issue from
the point of view of economic benefit and risk shifting. See United States v.
Carruthers, 219 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955), and cases cited therein. The Commis-
sioner at first agreed with this approach, acquiescing in the Tax Court's decision
in Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946), 1946-1 C.B. 3, but later withdrew his
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acquiescence (1950-1 C.B. 7) and issued Mimeo 6490, 1950-1 C.B. 9. The
congressional response in the 1954 Code was section 1235. As stated in the report
of the Senate Committee on Finance:
Under present law, an express assignment of patent rights by the owner, or
an exclusive license of the right to manufacture, use, and sell, the invention
thereunder for the life of the patent, can qualify as a "sale or exchange" for
tax purposes; thus, the holder can obtain capital-gains treatment on such a
transfer if he falls within the "amateur" category. Many court decisions have
arrived at this result, not only where the manner of payment has been a lump
sum, but also where the purchase price has been conditioned on the use or
profitability of the invention, i.e., where it takes the form of "royalty" pay-
ments. (See, e.g., Kronner v. United States, 110 F.Supp. 730 (Ct.Cls.1953);
Commissioner v. Celanese Corp., 140 F.2d 339 (C.A. of D.C. 1944); Com-
missioner v. Hopkinson, 126 F.2d 406 (C.C.A.2d 1942); Edward C. Myers, 6
T.C. 258 (1946), Non. Acq. 1950-1 CB 7.) However, in 1950 the prospect
of continued litigation was engendered in this area by the issuance of Mimeo-
graph 6490 (1950-1 CB 9), in which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
announced that he would thereafter regard such assignments or licenses as "pro-
viding for the payment of royalties taxable as ordinary income" if payment is
measured by the production, sale, or use of the property transferred or if it is
payable periodically over a period generally coterminous with the transferee's
use of the patent. To obviate the uncertainty caused by this mimeograph and
to provide an incentive to inventors to contribute to the welfare of the Nation,
your committee intends, in subsection (a), to give statutory assurance to cer-
tain patent holders that the sale of a patent (whether as an "assignment" or
"exclusive license") shall not be deemed not to constitute a "sale or exchange"
for tax purposes solely on account of the mode of payment.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 439 (1954).
In 1958, after the passage of section 1235, the Commissioner finally relented.
Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 C.B. 408.
With respect to the issues with which we deal in this article, several points con-
cerning section 1235 should be noted: First, the committee reports to the 1954
Code, and the 1956 amendment which made section 1235 retroactive to the 1939
Code, state that "no inference is to be drawn from this section as to what con-
stitutes a 'sale or exchange' in other than the patent field." S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 441 (1954). Second, after reviewing the history of the de-
velopments in the patent area, the Supreme Court in Clay Brown specifically
refused to take sides on the issue:
These developments in the patent field obviously do not help the position of
the Commissioner. Nor does § 1235, I. R. C. 1954 which expressly permits
specified patent sales to be treated as sales of capital assets entitled to capital
gains treatment. We need not, however, decide here whether the extraction
and patent cases are irreconcilable or whether, instead, each situation has its
own peculiar characteristics justifying discrete treatment under the sale and ex-
change language of § 1222. Whether the patent cases are correct or not, absent
§ 1235, the fact remains that this case involves the transfer of corporate stock
which has substantially appreciated in value and a purchase price payable from
income which has been held to reflect the fair market value of the assets which
the stock represents.
380 U.S. at 577 n.8.
Last, as we will discuss in some detail in the conclusion of this article, the
treatment of the transferee in the patent area has rendered the issue of sale moot
as to him, leaving the issue only one of capital gains to the transferor.
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Nowhere does the lengthy opinion note Clay Brown's reliance on
Anderson, nor does it discuss Perkins. The Court noted B's personal
liability for $900,000 110 but did not limit the amount realized from the
sale to $900,000, as would be required under Anderson and Perkins.
Beyond $900,000, A clearly retained the entire risk of loss; that portion
of his stock was retained, not sold.
What then is the legacy of Clay Brown for the AB transaction? The
single most discernible effect is the erosion, if not the complete demise,
of Perkins and the risk-benefit notion of what constitutes a sale. In
Allen, for example, the opinion does not discuss Perkins; nor does it
mention the Commissioner's risk shifting argument.1 In apparent ref-
erence to these points, the Tax Court noted that these "arguments of
law decided against respondent in Clay Brown are not subject to reliti-
gation here."' 12 True enough that Clay Brown refused to adopt whole-
sale a risk shifting test in place of a "common understanding of what
constitutes a sale." "I It is also true, however, that the Court went to
great lengths to distinguish Perkins under the doctrine of Anderson,1 4
and thus apparently continues to view risk shifting as relevant.1"
The second clearly discernible effect of Clay Brown has to do with
reasonableness of purchase price, or price within a reasonable range.
Indeed, the Commissioner dramatizes the importance of this issue by
his post-Clay Brown insistence upon it in Revenue Ruling 66-153 11 as
the criterion for a sale. The courts, as a result, tend to focus on this
question as dispositive, in whole or in part, of the sale issue."' Resolu-
tion of the issue along these lines, however, only begs the question.
Proper inquiry demands that there be shown a relationship between a
fair price and a sale. A fair price, standing alone, does not and cannot
determine whether one has retained or ended an interest in property.
110 34 T.C.M. at 255-56.
"I Brief for the Respondent at 311-30, Raymond L. Allen, 34 T.C.M. 242
(1975).
11 34 T.C.M. at 258. See also Larry D. Hibler, 46 T.C. 663 (1966), aj)d per
curiam, 383 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968).
11 380 U.S. at 575.
14 1d. at 576-77.
"
3 See Rose Hills Memorial Park Ass'n v. United States, 463 F.2d 425 (Ct. Cl.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973).
116 1966-1 C.B. 187.
117 See, e.g., Allen and Boone (found the price within a reasonable range and
held for the taxpayer); Berenson v. Comm'r, 507 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1974) (found
sale up to the amount of a fair price and nonsale for amounts beyond that price);
Aaron Kraut, 62 T.C. 420 (1974) (followed Kolkey on similar facts); Emanuel
N. Kolkey, 27 T.C. 37 (1956), afl'd, 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958) (pre-Clay
Brown case which held for the Commissioner where the purchase price was some
four times fair value).
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Thus, the undisputed presence of a fair price in Perkins did not make B
the purchaser of the production payments received by A. Further in-
quiry was required to determine the economic beneficiary of those pay-
ments. That inquiry properly goes to the issue of which of A and B
bears the economic risk of loss due to nonproduction. And so, while
in both cases the price was fair, in Perkins B had no risks as to the pro-
duction payments and was not a purchaser thereof, and in Anderson B
was such a purchaser due to a mortgage on his own assets.
So viewed, the question of reasonable price may be part of the overall
issue of risk shifting. Even though secured by a mortgage, a price which
is patently gross, payable solely from the earnings of the assets conveyed,
may, as we have shown, prevent any shifting of risks to B because he
can never acquire an interest in the remainder.'1 8 Where, however, the
price is secured neither by a mortgage, either on the assets conveyed or
on B's independent assets, nor by the personal liability of a solvent B,
then the price-reasonable or unreasonable, fixed or contingent-is
totally irrelevant. There can be no sale to B of amounts to be received
by A for which B has no risk of loss.
AB Transaction Under a Risk-Benefit Theory
Viewed through this risk-benefit theory, cases such as Bryant fall
within the principle of Perkins and are outside of Anderson. Where A
conveys to B a remainder for cash, retaining a production payment
limited by a fixed sum, none of the production payments to A are of
benefit to B if A can recover that sum solely from the produce of the
property. As a practical matter, there may be only a few situations in
which A would not demand a security interest, such as a mortgage on
the remainder. This is a matter which can only be left to the parties'
assessment of the degree of risk and their bargaining strength and abili-
ties with respect to such risks." ' There are situations, however, in which
a security interest such as a mortgage would be meaningless. If A re-
serves a right of occupancy for two and one half years pending com-
pletion of its new plant, as in Alstores Realty, or if A reserves a life
estate in a homestead, as in Kreusel, there is no amount of money pres-
ent which could be affected by a security interest, and necessarily it is
only A who bears the risks of the reserved term. Likewise, if A reserves
a right to a percentage of profits for a period of time without any dollar
limit thereon, there is no sum which can be subject to a security interest.
.. See, e.g., Aaron Kraut, 62 T.C. 420 (1974); Emanuel N. Kolkey, 27 T.C.
37 (1956), afl'd, 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958). Cf. Berenson v. Comm'r, 507
F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1974).
.. See Estate of Stranahan v. Comm'r, 472 F.2d 867, 871 (6th Cir. 1973).
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If, as in Allen, the reserved right is to a percentage of profits for 15
years but is no less than $900,000, then the presence of a mortgage to
secure payment of $900,000 may shift the risk of loss to B because his
remainder is burdened by the mortgage, but not beyond the time it takes
for A to receive $900,000. After that the mortgage is a nullity; B bears
none of the risks of A's right to receive a percentage of profits and only
A should be taxable on these profits.
To what extent, if at all, is this risk-benefit analysis affected by the
formal legal trappings used by the parties in structuring the transaction?
In Bryant, the transaction was structured in the classic ABC mold
whereby A, desiring $1,175,000 for his entire interest, transferred the
remainder to B for cash, and reserved a production payment in the
amount of $250,000, plus interest on the outstanding balance, which A
sold to C.12 0 B undertook no personal liability for the production pay-
ment, nor was it secured by a mortgage on any asset. Standing alone,
under Perkins these facts compel a finding of complete lack of risk
shifting. Nevertheless, the court taxed the production payments to B,
citing three factors in making what it termed a "factual determina-
tion." 1.
(1) The production payment was limited to a specific amount and
was part of a total figure "which the seller expects to receive and the
purchaser expects to pay."
(2) The duration of the payments: "If limited to a short term
and a sum certain, they are less likely to be deemed attributable to
continued ownership by the seller." ,.
(3) "Finally, when interest is to accrue on the unpaid balance of
the total sum, it would seem that the entire amount is a debt from the
time of the sale and that the periodic payments are simply made in
reduction of the debt. We stress this interest factor, for we consider
11 It should be noted that the $250,000 production payment was purchased by
a short-term Clifford-type trust created by B for the benefit of his children, and
funded by B with $100,000. This $100,000, together with S150,000, advanced
by a bank on the security of the production payment, was used to buy the pro-
duction payment. Under the rationale of the court that Perkins did not apply, B
was taxed on the entire amount of the production payment. Thus, there was no
discussion of B's taxability on the independent ground that B's funds, in which B
had a reversionary interest, had been used to purchase 100/250 of the production
payment. Indeed, the opinion of the Tax Court noted that "we do not have to
consider what effect, if any, the use of 10 year reversionary trusts has in the
arrangement," Olin Bryant, 46 T.C. 848, 858 (1966). This view was apparently
acquiesced in by the court of appeals. 399 F.2d 800, 804 n.3 (5th Cir. 1968).
399 F.2d at 805.
'Ibid.
Id. at 805-806.
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it a sure sign that the parties in this case intended to complete a sale
of the entire property for $1,175,000." 12t
How do these three factors change the result in Perkins? The phe-
nomenon of a production payment limited to a specific amount which
is part of a total figure which is no doubt the full value of the property
was also present in Perkins. Without the presence of a mortgage or
other security interest, these facts indicate no shift of any risk to B.
Likewise, a short payout period for a sum certain has relevance to risk
shifting only when coupled with a security interest in the remainder con-
veyed, or B's other assets. With a mortgage on B's remainder interest,
the shorter the payout period, the less time it takes to produce A's
cushion, i.e., his independent source for satisfaction of his claim, thereby
more quickly increasing B's risks and diminishing A's.
The court stressed the interest factor. This is truly a red herring be-
cause it begs the entire question of whether B has purchased the produc-
tion payment on credit. Unless B has an obligation, whether personal
or by pledge of some asset of his, to purchase the production payment,
he has no debt upon which he will owe or pay interest. Lacking B's
personal obligation guaranteeing the production payment, or a mortgage
on any asset of his securing the payment, B owes nothing on account of
the payment-has no debt with respect thereto-hence, pays no interest.
The fact that the agreement calls for interest indicates only that A wants
compensation for having to wait for his money, which is interest, but it
is part of A's reserved rights, payable only from produce of the property,
entirely at A's risk, and not an obligation of B's. In terms of a familiar
example, if A owns Blackacre, value $100X, and sells to B the remain-
der for $83X, A will reserve the right to the first $20X of rents, or will
reserve the first $17X plus interest of $3X. The form in which the trans-
action is cast makes no difference to A or B, economically or legally.
Unless some asset, or B's personal liability, is pledged to secure pay-
ment of interest, it is not B who pays it.
Another fact present in Bryant was the provision of the conveyance
that bound B to work the farm presumably to produce the crops out of
which the production payment would be satisfied. The Bryant court
attributed no significance to these facts, but a refined analysis would
require B to reflect in his income payments received by A attributable to
labor supplied by B, and that B add the same amount to the cost basis
of his remainder interest in Blackacre. Thus, if B himself did the neces-
sary work, he has sold to A the fair market value of his services in ex-
change for a portion of the remainder interest. B has income from ser-
124 Id. at 806.
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vices and a capital expenditure for the remainder in Blackacre." If B
pays an employee to perform services, again, this is a cost of the re-
mainder to B, although he gets no further inclusion in income if the
salary is paid with after-tax dollars. In neither case do B's services effect
a shift of risks from A to B unless the production payment to A is se-
cured by a mortgage on B's remainder interest.
Most importantly, the court is not, as stated in Br yant, required to
make a factual determination. The factors involved were clear and un-
disputed; the only issue to be resolved was the legal issue, which must
be resolved under the principles of Perkins and Anderson.
Alstores Realty presents a unique treatment of the AB transaction.
Usually the Commissioner is attempting to tax B on income received
by A as A receives it, and in the amount received, as in Bryant. In
Alstores Realty, however, where A sold B the remainder in real estate
and reserved occupancy for a two and one half year term, the Commis-
sioner asserted that B, an accrual basis taxpayer, had rental income in
the amount of the rental value of the two and one half year term. In
other words, instead of taxing to B the rental value of the property as
it benefitted A--over the period of time it was received by A through
profits in the manufacture and sale of pianos-the Commissioner taxed
B in advance of actual receipt by A, on the capitalized value of A's
future receipts, attributable to rental value. So viewed, and aside from
questions of accounting methods, the basic issue raised by Aistores
Realty is identical to that in Bryant, to wit, to what extent shall B be
considered the economic beneficiary of amounts received by A as rental
value of the property during the two and one half year term? And under
Perkins and Anderson the answer remains: only to the extent such in-
come is at B's risk rather than A's.
In Alstores Realty, the Tax Court appeared to approach the problem
through a risk-benefit theory, relying on McCulley Ashlock '- and
Perkins for the proposition that rents received by A could not be taxed
to B unless B had "the benefits of ownership." I--, Applying this test, B
was taxable on $250,000 of prepaid rent because of the form in which
the transaction was cast (A acquired the two and one half year term
under a standard form lease, B was to bear the cost of utilities and A
could not alter the building or assign its interest without B's consent)
and because B agreed to pay to A a certain amount in the event A lost
5 Comm'r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. I (1974); Producers Chemical Co.,
50 T.C. 940 (1968); L.W. Brooks, 50 T.C. 927 (1968), rev'd, 424 F.2d 116 (5th
Cir. 1970) (Tax Court opinion discussed with approval in Idaho Power Co.).
= 18 T.C. 405 (1952).
7 46 T.C. at 371-72.
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occupancy by reason of act of God, or fault of B, computed at 64 ¢
per square foot per month of occupied space. 128 This was the fair rental
value of the space occupied. 29
Of "key significance"'130 to the Tax Court was B's liability for A's
loss of occupancy. This the court found "entirely inconsistent with the
theory that Steinway had a reserved estate for years; why should peti-
tioner, the alleged remainderman, be required to make payments to
Steinway, the alleged owner of an estate for years, as a result of non-
occupancy by the latter? What we really have here is a provision for
reimbursement of prepaid rent in the event the tenant is denied ...
occupancy, the prepaid rent being in the form of the value of the prop-
erty received by petitioner in excess of the $750,000 cash paid there-
for." 131
It is submitted that the label attached to B of fee owner-landlord
rather than remainderman in no way resolves the issue of whether B is
taxable on rental value received by A. Whether A's term for years is
leased from B or is reserved by A, in both situations A will have the
rights and burdens of a temporary occupant of the premises and B will
basically have a future interest taking effect in possession when A's term
is over. The landlord-tenant category, into which the Tax Court seems
to place the Alstores Realty transaction, does not, without more, make
B taxable on A's receipts of profits. The only result of such a relation-
ship is that A, the tenant, will be taxable on profits received by him and
B. the landlord, on rentals in fact paid (or payable) to him by A. Thus,
if B buys the fee in Blackacre from C for $1 million and then sells A
a term for two and one half years, in an arm's length transaction, B will
not convey the term for less than its value, $250,000. B will be taxed
on $250,000 prepaid rents because he will in fact have received them.
He will not be taxed on the rents derived by A from use of the property
and in which he has no interest. 21 -
128 Id. at 372.
129 Id. at 368.
130 id. at 372.
' Id. at 372-73.
132 The actual issue raised by the Commissioner before the Tax Court was
whether B was taxable on the value of the two and one half year term as prepaid
rent, and the actual decision of the Tax Court upheld the Commissioner. To sup-
port such a holding, however, the Tax Court should have used a step transaction
or integrated transaction doctrine to find that the overall substance of the con-
veyance was two independent transactions, neither of which depended on the
other, the effect of which was for B to pay $1 million for the fee, acquire a cost
basis of $1 million and lease back a two and one half year term to A for $250,000
in an unrelated transaction. In such case B is properly taxed on the cash received
from A, and not on A's income from rental value in which B has no economic
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So, it is not the form of the transaction that should determine B's tax-
ability for A's receipt of rental value. This issue turns on whether B is
the economic beneficiary of such payments. Certainly if B had guaran-
teed to A a return of 61/4 ¢ per square foot per month in all events, then
Anderson would apply and B would be taxable because B would then
bear the entire risk of A receiving such rental value. The guarantee in
Alstores Realty was a contingent one, however, basically limited to ouster
on account of acts of God. B's risks were so remote as to justify com-
pletely disregarding them. In no event, however, should B have been
taxed on an overall amount greater than the cost of an insurance policy
to protect against these risks for the two and one half year term.
Nor can one see how B's responsibility for the payment of utilities
gave him the benefit of rental value received by A. B's liability for
utilities was absolute and would be in no way affected (i.e., reduced or
increased) by the production (or lack thereof) of rental profits. In no
manner did this liability shift any of the risks of profits from A to B.
The utility payments are properly treated as part of B's cost for the re-
mainder; or if B were receiving any income from A, such as rent (which
was not the case in Alstores Realty), the utility payments would be the
cost of producing such income, giving rise to a deduction under section
162 or section 212. Similarly, the fact that A could not alter the build-
ing or sublet did not shift any of the income producing risks to B. If
anything, these restrictions increased A's risks by locking him into the
lease.
Analyzed under a theory of economic benefit, it is seen that such
cases as Bryant, Alstores Realty and Allen are taxing B on income
received by A even though B has no economic connection with that
income. The implicit effect of these cases, though unperceived and un-
intended, is to tax B on some presumed increase in the value of his
remainder interest on an original issue discount notion, such as is em-
bodied in section 1232, even though there is no warrant for doing so
either in the statute or in the cases.
As stated by Bryant with respect to B: "The new owner of the prop-
erty derived a benefit from all the income, including that later remitted
to the seller, because with that income he purchased an asset. The profits
from the property were ordinary income to him." 133
interest. In Alstores Realty, however, A would not have agreed to a sale unless
it could retain possession until its new plant was ready for occupancy. 46 T.C.
at 366. Therefore, it would appear that the substance of the transaction was that
A reserved the two and one half year term, did not pay B rent of S250,000 for
it, and conveyed to B only the remainder interest at a cost to B of S750,000.
1-1399 F.2d at 805 (emphasis added).
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The court perceives a connection between the income received by A
and gain to B, but sees the connection as B's income being used to pur-
chase A's term for years (B already having purchased the remainder
for cash). Properly viewed, however, the only nexus between A's in-
come and B's gain is that payments to A bring the remainder closer in
time to, so that it will eventually become, a fee interest in all of the
property. Such gain is not presently taxed by section 1232, nor any
similar statute. And if it were to be taxed to B, in no event would it
necessarily be the same as amounts received by A as production pay-
ments because there is no necessary relationship between the amounts
of payments received by A and the amount of increase in the value of
B's remainder.
Congress and the AB Transaction
Section 636(b)
As will be seen, the same analytical error which led the court in Bryant
to conclude that in an AB situation the income paid to A benefits B
even without a mortgage on any separate asset of B became the stated
basis for the enactment in 1969 of section 636(b) which provides:
A production payment retained on the sale of a mineral property shall
be treated, for purposes of this subtitle, as if it were a purchase money
mortgage loan and shall not qualify as an economic interest in the mineral
property.
This section was originally recommended as part of the Tax Reform
Studies and Proposals of the Treasury Department formulated during
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and adopted by the Nixon
administration in 1969.1:11 Although this provision, from the beginning,
was considered together with a similar proposal which dealt with carved
out production payments and which became section 636(a), we may
conveniently treat section 636(b) separately at this point since it is
addressed to a different type of transaction than is section 636(a).
The fullest discussion of the reasons for the enactment of section
636(b) is contained in the House report which begins by setting forth
the "Present Law" on the subject:
A mineral production payment is a right to a specified share of the pro-
duction from a mineral property (or a sum of money in place of the produc-
tion) when that production occurs. The payment is secured by an interest
... STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST
CONG., 1ST SESS., SUMMARY OF H.R. 13270, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 (Part
2), at 256-60 (Comm. Print 1969) (herein cited as TREASURY PROPOSALS).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 3 1:TAX LAW REVIEW
ANALYSIS OF INCOME INTERESTS
in the minerals, the right to the production is for a period of time shorter
than the expected life of the property, and the production payment usually
bears interest. Depending on how a production payment is created, it may
be classified as a carved-out production payment, or retained production
payment which may then be used in a so-called A-B-C transaction.
A retained production payment is created when the owner of a mineral
interest sells the working interest, but reserves a production payment for
himself. Under present law the owner of the retained production payment
receives income for which percentage depletion may be taken during the
payout period, or period during which he receives a part of the production
(or a payment based on production). The purchaser of the working in-
terest excludes the amounts used to satisfy the production payment during
the payout period....
The so-called A-B-C transaction is the same as a retained production
payment case, except that after selling the working interest, the initial
owner then sells the "retained production payment." Thus, in an A-B-C
transaction, the owner of the mineral property, A, sells it to a second
person, B, and reserves a production payment (bearing interest) for a
major portion of the purchase price. He then sells the production payment
to a third party, C, which is usually a financial institution, or, perhaps, a
tax-exempt organization.13 5
With this introduction the report then states the "General reasons for
change":
The treatment of mineral production payments under present law has
resulted in what are essentially two problems, one relating to carved-out
production payments and one relating to retained production payments and
A-B-C transactions....
In each of the three situations (the carved-out production payment, the
retained production payment, and the A-B-C transaction), the transaction
is similar, in fact, to a loan transaction with the loan secured by a mortgage
on the property and the "borrower" not personally liable for the loan....
In an A-B-C transaction, the analogy is to the sale of a property but sub-
ject to a mortgage subsequently sold to someone else.
The factual similarity between the creation of a production payment and
a loan transaction and the disparate tax treatment of production payments
and loans can be illustrated by examining two hypothetical A-B-C trans-
actions, one involving an oil payment, and the other the sale of an apart-
ment.
Assume that A sells an operating business to B-the business may be
an oil well, or it may be an apartment building. However, assume that A
retains the right to a production payment-a payment equivalent to the
current price of a specified number of barrels of oil-or in the case of the
apartment building, a mortgage, which is not much different from the pro-
duction payment. Then suppose that A sells the production payment or
mortgage to C.
13H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 138-39 (1969).
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From A's standpoint, the two transactions are treated the same-they
both result in a capital gain-or loss-to A depending upon his cost or
other basis whether it is the apartment building or oil well which is being
sold.
However, the similarity between the oil well and the apartment building
ends here. In the case of the apartment building, all of the rental income
after ordinary expenses and depreciation is taxable income to B and he
must pay off the mortgage out of "after tax" dollars.
In the case of the oil well, however, B is not considered as receiving the
production payment at all-which, in the typical case, may well amount to
as much as 90 percent of the income from the well. Thus, in this case B
is, in effect, paying the production payment out of "before-tax dollars."
This privilege of paying off capital interests out of tax-free dollars is not a
privilege accorded ordinary taxpayers ...
At the same time, B is paying little or no tax in the case of the oil well,
C who is receiving the production payment is receiving cost depletion on
this payment. Thus, he is amortizing his entire cost over the period he
receives his payments.
The C who has the mortgage on the apartment house fares no better
than his counterpart with the production payment despite the special ad-
vantages of the B with the oil well. The C with the mortgage can spread
his cost over the period of the mortgage but, presumably, any excess he
receive [sic] is interest income and therefore ordinary income.
The crucial difference between the A-B-C transaction in oil and the
mortgage for the apartment, therefore, lies in the treatment of B and the
fact that in the A-B-C transaction B can amortize C's capital interest out
of tax-free dollars rather than the "after-tax dollars" he must use in the
apartment case.
Your committee can see no reason why a person who, in effect, is the
borrower in a production payment transaction should be allowed to pay
off the loan with tax-free dollars while a borrower of funds in any other
industry must satisfy the loan out of taxed dollars.... Moreover, the com-
mittee is concerned with the substantial revenue loss which results from
the use of production payments. It is estimated that the combined revenue
loss from ABC transactions and carved-out production payments is be-
tween $200 and $350 million annually. An acceleration of the revenue
loss can be expected unless corrective action is taken.136
The committee's and eventually Congress' solution for the ABC prob-
lem was:
In the case of retained production payments (that is, the sale of mineral
property subject to a production payment), the bill provides that the pro-
duction payment is to be treated as a purchase money mortgage loan
(rather than as an economic interest in the mineral property). Accord-
ingly, the income derived from the property which is used to satisfy the
130Id. at 139-41 (emphasis added).
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payment would be taxable to the owner of the mineral property subject,
of course, to the allowance for depletion.13-
The difficulty with the committee's presentation is that it is based on
a false premise, i.e., that there is no difference between an AB trans-
action where A has a lien on a separate asset of B and an AB transac-
tion where no such lien exists. In comparing the sale of an oil well with
the sale of an apartment building, the committee states that the A who
sold the apartment building retained "a mortgage, which is not much
different from the production payment." But, as we have seen, this is
the crucial difference established by the Supreme Court in Anderson in
distinguishing Perkins. The mortgage on the apartment building in the
committee's hypothetical is the equivalent of the "lien on the fee," the
presence of which made all the difference to the Court in Anderson as
compared to a lien merely on the production of oil in Perkins which,
as the Supreme Court in Anderson said, left A still dependent solely on
the production of oil.
In the language of the Treasury Proposals which preceded the com-
mittee's report, the error is even clearer. In its discussion of "ABC trans-
actions and retained production payments," the Treasury stated: "The
proposal... corrects disparate treatment of ABC transactions that exists
under present law.... Under present law if B, in an ABC transaction,
guarantees the production payment, then the transaction is treated as a
loan. There is no reason to differentiate the tax treatment of these fi-
nancing transactions, and the proposal reaches this result.""'
To say that there is no difference between an AB (or ABC) where A
has no lien on any of B's assets (i.e., the transaction is treated as a loan
by section 636(b) ) and the AB transaction where B guarantees the pro-
duction payment, flies right in the face of the distinction between Ander-
son and Perkins. The reason for the Treasury's error in this regard
seems apparent from the footnote to this proposition in which it is stated:
"This conforms to tax treatment of financing transactions in other areas.
For example, the tax treatment of the mortgagor and mortgagee in a
real estate transaction is the same regardless of whether the mortgagee
looks only to the property as security or whether he also has the per-
sonal liability of the mortgagor. There is no reason for a different rule
where the property involved is a mineral interest." '
What this footnote implies, of course, is that the situation where a
mortgagee can look only to the property mortgaged and not to any
other assets of the mortgagor is the same as the situation where there
1'3 Id. at 141.
I's TREASURY PROPOSALS, at 260.
129 Id. at 260 n.3.
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is no mortgage at all on any assets. Now it is one thing to equate a
mortgage without personal liability to a mortgage with personal liability,
since personal liability merely means general asset liability so that the
mortgagee who has the personal liability of the mortgagor can look to
assets other than the specific property mortgaged. It is totally different,
and erroneous, to equate a mortgage situation to a nonmortgage situ-
ation as does section 636(b).
The Treasury elaborated on its position in a department memorandum
prepared during the course of the legislative hearings on section 636(b),
in response to a constitutional challenge to that proposed section. The
challenge was based on the argument that section 636(b) would have
the effect of taxing C's (or A's) income to B in an ABC (or AB) situ-
ation where there was no mortgage given by B to A or to C on any of
B's separate assets. In response to this argument the Treasury discussed
Anderson and Perkins in the following manner:
In Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940), the Court held that
the owner of the working interest in mineral property was taxable on the
proceeds of mineral production used to pay off a "production payment."
This "production payment" was secured by an interest in the oil and gas
production and by an interest in the fee title to the lands conveyed. This
additional security, in the opinion of the Court, served to distinguish a
contrary result reached in Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937), where
a production payment was only payable out of oil if, as and when produced.
This difference in the security interest involved in the Thomas v. Perkins
and Anderson v. Helvering cases is, of course, not a difference of constitu-
tional dimensions. The essence of a lending transaction is not affected by
the nature of the security interest involved. It follows that there can be
no constitutional objection to the Treasury proposal which would merely
extend the rule of Anderson v. Helvering to all production payment trans-
actions, regardless of the nature of the underlying security.140
Aside from whether the question involved is of "constitutional dimen-
sions" the key language in the Treasury's position is its statement: "The
essence of a lending transaction is not affected by the nature of the
security interest involved."
But again, it is one thing to say that a transaction is a loan if there
is a security interest involved, regardless of the nature of the security
interest (i.e., whether the security is a specific asset as opposed to a pool
of assets or is one specific asset as opposed to another specific asset).
It is quite a different theory to say that a "lending transaction is not
140 Memorandum Re Constitutionality of the Treasury Proposal Regarding the
Treatment of Production Payments, Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate
Committee on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, 4617, at 4621-622 (1969)
(footnotes omitted).
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affected by the [existence of any] security interest." Such a proposition
is the equivalent of saying that a loan has taken place even where there
is no liability (specific asset or general asset, i.e., personal) for payment.
This, of course, renders the word "loan" or the phrase "lending trans-
action" meaningless. And yet this is exactly what section 636(b) does,
since it treats as a loan a transaction where B has no liability to pay,
since none of B's assets are the subject of a lien for payments either by
way of specific lien or general personal liability.
It is thus erroneous to say, as the Treasury's memorandum does, that
section 636(b) "merely extend[s] the rule of Anderson v. Helvering to
all production payment transactions, regardless of the nature of the un-
derlying security." What section 636(b) actually does is reject Ander-
son's distinction of Perkins and overrule the holding of the latter case.
If section 636(b) treats as a loan what is not a loan, what, it may be
asked, moved the Congress to enact such a provision? The answer seems
to lie in the proposition which originated with the Treasury Proposals,'
was repeated in the House and Senate reports '1- and was finally con-
firmed in the following language of the General Explanation of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation: "The Congress saw no reason why a person
who, in effect, is the borrower in a production payment transaction
should be allowed to pay off the loan with tax-free dollars while a bor-
rower of funds in any other industry must satisfy the loan out of taxed
dollars." 143
Why is it that Congress saw B in an AB or ABC transaction as being
allowed "to pay off" a loan when B was not liable, personally or other-
wise, for such payment? For the same reason, it would seem, that the
Fifth Circuit in Bryant saw B there as having had the benefit of the in-
come paid to A-namely, "because with that income [B] purchased an
asset."' 44 But, that statement, in a situation where B has no liability,
means nothing other than that B's remainder interest in fee is approach-
ing a present interest in fee. Whatever gain B has he has solely by virtue
of that phenomenon. The effect of section 636(b), therefore, is to tax
B on a section 1232 original issue discount theory without regard, how-
ever, to whether there is any correlation between the increase in the
value of B's remainder and the amounts paid to A. Such a result cer-
141See N. 134 supra and the accompanying text.
142 H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 140-41 (1969); S.
REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 184 (1969).
143STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91sT
CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at
159 (Comm. Print 1970).
14 399 F.2d at 805.
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acted section 636(b), any more than the Bryant court seems to have
been aware of the real effect of its holding.
Gratuitous Transfers
Just as cases like Bryant and Alstores Realty create a direct conflict
with the basic economic benefit theory of Whitehouse and Perkins, so
also is section 636(b) in direct conflict with the statutory treatment of
AB situations which arise as a result of a gift or bequest. Suppose, e.g.,
that X devises Blackacre to T in trust to pay the income to A until such
income reaches $250,000, the trust then to end and T to convey Blackacre
to B. Does B include any of the income from Blackacre as it is paid to
A? Clearly not. The specific provisions of subchapter J of the Code
tax the trust income only to A and there is no attempt to tax B, even
though B's remainder is (or may be) increasing in value, or to put it in
the words of the Bryant court, even though "with that income he [B]
has purchased an asset." Moreover, if Blackacre is an oil well, the result
is not changed, since section 636(b) applies only "on the sale of a
mineral property." ", And yet the fact is that the B who has acquired
his remainder by gift or bequest is in precisely the same position as the
B who has purchased his remainder without giving a mortgage on any
of his assets (including the remainder) to secure the payment of any
"I5 The same result occurs if there is no trust, but A is devised the income from
Blackacre up to a certain amount, with the remainder in fee to B. Here the ap-
plicable section is section 102(b) (2) which excepts from the gift exclusion a gift
or bequest "of income." An interesting question is presented by the first sentence
of the flush material to section 102(b) which provides: "Where, under.the terms
of the gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance, the payment is to be made at inter-
vals, then to the extent that it is paid . .. out of income from property, it shall
be treated .. as a gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance of income from property."
In light of this provision, if, e.g., T bequeathed a certain fund to B but charged
that fund with an annuity to be paid to A, say of $5,000 a year for 20 years, to
be paid in any event, i.e., whether or not there was sufficient income from the
fund, it would appear that under the holding of Whitehouse, B and not A would
pay the tax on the income generated by the fund upon which the annuity was a
charge. Such a result would be entirely consistent with Anderson, since such a
situation is the equivalent of a mortgage on a separate asset of B and the income
generated by the fund benefits B since A's annuity is to be paid in any event. On
the other hand, if the annuity is set up by way of a trust with the trustee to pay
A the annuity, in any event, i.e., out of corpus if income is not sufficient, the
specific provisions of subchapter J tax the income to A (to the extent of dis-
tributable net income) and not to B. See Del Cotto & Joyce, Taxation of the
Trust Annuity: The Unitrust Under the Constitution and the Internal Revenue
Code, 23 TAX L. REv. 257, 270 et seq. (1968). To this extent, therefore, there
is an inconsistency in the statutory treatment of the AB situations even within the
gift and bequest context.
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amount to A. Neither is liable for payments to A and the remainder of
both will (or will not) progress in value without regard to whether the
remainder was acquired by gift or purchase. 4 "
If there is no theoretical justification for treating B differently depend-
ing on whether he purchases his remainder or receives it by gift, is there
some practical explanation for the difference in treatment? Put another
way, why, in the case where A and B receive their interests by gift, does
the government not attempt to tax B on the amounts received by A in
the same way in which it convinced the court in Bryant, and the Con-
gress in section 636(b), to tax B in the case where B purchases his re-
mainder? The answer seems to be that in a gift situation the govern-
ment can tax the income fully to A and therefore need not pursue B.
This is not only because of the statutory provisions which require A to
include the income in his gross income, but, equally as important, be-
cause of section 273 which prevents A from taking a deduction by way
of amortization for the wasting of his asset, i.e., the income interest. 14-
However, in cases like Bryant, and those in the mineral area covered
by section 636(b), A is not governed by section 273, since that section
only applies to income interests acquired by gift, bequest or inheritance.
Thus, where, e.g., A has acquired Blackacre by purchase, if A sells a
14Indeed, if one had to choose between the B who purchased his remainder
and the B who received his remainder by gift or bequest, the more likely candi-
date of whom to require the inclusion in income of amounts paid to A would be
the B who acquired his remainder by gift or bequest, not because he is able to
exclude the value of his remainder as a tax-exempt gift under section 102(a), but
because of the regulations which dictate an increase in the basis of B in his re-
mainder interest merely by the passage of time without regard to the fact that B
is not required to include any amount in income by virtue of any increase in the
value of his remainder due to such passage of time. Reg. §§ 1.1014-5(a)(2);
1.1015-1(b).
147 The legislative history to section 273 sheds little light on the reason for its
enactment. Both the House and Senate reports say only:
Under existing law persons receiving by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance a
life or other terminable interest in property, frequently capitalize the expected
future income, set up the value of this expectation as corpus or principal, and
thereafter claim a deduction for exhaustion of this so-called principal on the
ground that with the passage of time the "principal" or corpus is gradually
shrinking or wasting. This section explicitly provides that no such deduction
shall be recognized.
H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), reproduced in 1939-1 C.B.
168, 177; S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), reproduced in 1939-1
C.B. 181, 191-92.
No reason is given why the value of a terminable interest should be viewed as
"so-called principal" and thus denied a basis for amortization, where the same
type of interest would, if purchased, be principal and would thus have an eligible
basis for amortization.
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remainder to B and retains an income interest, A would not be pre-
vented by section 273 from taking an amortization deduction. In the
classic ABC oil transaction, A would sell his income interest to C and
C, having purchased the interest, would not be prevented by section 273
from taking his amortization deduction. The situation would thus have
changed dramatically from the government's point of view. Whereas,
prior to the transaction A was being taxed on all the income from Black-
acre, now a large portion of the income was being offset by C's amorti-
zation deduction. To illustrate, using a familiar example, suppose A
owned Blackacre purchased for $ 1 OOX with a present fair market value
of $100X, and Blackacre earns an annual net rent of $1OX. If A re-
mains the owner of the fee and receives the $1 OX rent for year 1 and
year 2, the government receives tax on $1 OX in year 1 and $1 OX in
year 2. Now suppose A sells a remainder to B for $83X, and reserves
a two year term (or a $20X production payment) which A simulta-
neously sells to C for $17X. Without more, when C receives $10X in
year 1 and year 2, C will offset those amounts by $17X and the govern-
ment loses the tax on $17X. Again, without more, after the end of the
two year period or the $20X payout, B would own the full fee interest
in Blackacre and the government would again be able to collect tax on
$10X per year. Would this mean the government would have lost for-
ever the tax on the $17X of year 1 and year 2? Not necessarily, since
B's basis would remain at $83X, i.e., what he paid for the remainder.
If B sold the property for $100X, the government would recoup its tax
on $17X (perhaps even at ordinary income rates 148), but that tax would
have been deferred until such time as B sold the property."'o It was this
loss of immediate tax, i.e., the deferral effect, which was the source of
the government's loss of revenue in the ABC transaction. It was (and
is) the presence of section 273 which prevents this deferral loss in a
case where A acquires his income interest by gift or bequest. To pre-
vent this loss of revenue, in the ABC nongift cases, i.e., transactions and
cases like Bryant, the government has attempted to tax B. Essentially
what the government has done in these nongift situations-where A,
who once owned in fee simple and paid tax on all the income, has split
the interests in Blackacre between himself and B (AB) or between B
148See Jones v. Comm'r, 330 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1964).
"I As in many deferral situations, of course, the deferral could become a per-
manent exclusion. If, e.g., the property decreased in value to $83X and was sold
at that price by B, the tax on $17X would be lost. If B died when the property
was worth $100X, section 1014 might give B's heirs a stepped-up basis of $100X,
although it could be argued that the $17X is income in respect of a decedent
under section 691 (similar to accrued interest on a bond), and that the basis of
B's heirs should therefore remain at $83X.
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and C (ABC)-is to attempt to have the situation viewed as if B owned
the entire fee simple and should thus be treated as A was treated before
the interests in Blackacre were split. This solution is unnecessary where
the income interest is acquired by gift because section 273 provides the
same result for the government, i.e., the entire income is taxed to one
individual (now the income beneficiary rather than the remainderman)
as though that individual owned the entire fee simple.
Thus, the government isn't concerned with favoring remaindermen
over those who own income interests, or vice versa. What the govern-
ment has sought to avoid is deferral loss. In the gift area this is done
at the expense of the owner of the income interest; in the nongift area
like Bryant and the ABC transactions, the remainderman pays the bill.
Section 1001(e)
Nothing would serve to illustrate these propositions more clearly than
the recent reaction of the government to the attempt by the owner of
the income interest acquired by gift to escape the disadvantage of sec-
tion 273. The story is best told in the House report on what became
section 1001 (e) of the Code:
Present la.-Under present law, when a life estate and remainder in-
terest in property are acquired by gift, bequest, or inheritance, a so-called
"uniform basis" rule is applied with the basis of the property divided be-
tween the life estate and the remainder. (As the life estate is used up each
year, its basis is reduced, and the basis of the remainder interest is in-
creased in the same amount-hence, the combined basis of the life estate
and the remainder interest remains the same from year to year.)
The life tenant is not permitted to amortize his basis over the length of
the life estate because this would reduce for tax purposes the amount of
income he receives. However, where the life tenant sells his right to re-
ceive future income, his basis in the property may be used in reducing the
gain he receives on the sale.'1' °
At this point we may interrupt and consider what solutions were avail-
able for the perceived problem. Note that the actors in this scenario
closely resemble those in the ABC transaction: A the owner-seller of
the income interest, C the purchaser of the income interest and B the
owner of the remainder. Should not the solution then be the same?
Shouldn't B be required to include the income on the Bryant theory that
he benefits by the income since "with it he has purchased an asset" or
on the congressional rationale of section 636(b) that B should not, un-
like everyone else, be able to pay off what is, in effect, a loan with be-
fore-tax dollars?
150H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 156-57 (1969).
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But this was not the solution chosen; rather, the decision was to con-
tinue to prefer B over A. As the report continued:
Explanation of provision.-Your committee's bill provides a new rule
for determining the amount of gain or loss from the sale or other disposi-
tion of a life interest (or an interest for a term of years) in property or an
income interest in a trust. In such a case, the bill provides that any portion
of a taxpayer's adjusted basis determined under sections 1014 or 1015 of
the code (dealing with the basis of property acquired by gift, from a dece-
dent, or by a transfer in trust) is disregarded to the extent that the adjusted
basis is a portion of the entire adjusted basis for the property.
Thus, where there is a sale or other disposition of a life (or term of
years) interest in property, or an income interest in a trust-which was
acquired by gift, bequest, inheritance, or by a transfer in trust-there is
to be no cost or other basis to offset the proceeds received from the dis-
position. Accordingly, the person disposing of such an interest is to be
required to treat as gain the entire amount he receives from the disposition
of his interest, rather than only the excess of the amount received over
his basis.151
Thus, the deferral loss is avoided by requiring A to accelerate the
income he would be taxed on if he did not dispose of his interest, a
rather drastic solution from A's point of view.132
But suppose that in addition to A selling his income interest, B sells
his remainder. Suppose, i.e., both A and B sell to C. A, of course, is
in precisely the same economic position as he would have been in if B
had not sold his remainder. Isn't he therefore to be treated in the same
way, i.e., required to report his entire amount realized as gain?
"No," said the committee, with the following explanation:
The bill, however, does not change present law in the situation where
there is a sale or other disposition of a life or term of years interest in
property (or an income interest in trust) which is a part of a transaction
in which the entire fee interest is transferred to any person or persons.
Thus, where a life tenant and remainderman simultaneously sell the entire
fee interest in property in a single transaction, it is to be treated in the
same manner as under existing law; the gain each [sic] receives is to be
measured by the excess of the proceeds received on the disposition over
the adjusted basis in the life estate. Your committee believes this exception
is appropriate, since in this case the purchaser acquires a single entire in-
terest in the property and, therefore, he is not allowed to amortize the
separate life interest. Thus, he is taxed on the income from the property.,1 3
151 Id. at 157.
152 Presumably, however, A's gain could still qualify for preferential capital
gain treatment. See McAllister v. Comm'r, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1947).
"
3 H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1969) (emphasis
added). It should also be noted in this situation that unless A is given his basis
as an offset against the amount he realizes, that portion of the uniform basis will
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From the above it seems clear that the motivating force of the govern-
ment's position in the various AB and ABC situations is the avoidance
of deferral loss by the taxation of the income from particular property
to some person as though that person owned the property in fee simple.
Where the property interests are split between taxpayers, one owning a
future interest (remainder), the other a present (income) interest, the
choice of the taxable person is made to depend on whether the interests
are received gratuitously or for consideration. If the income interest
has been acquired gratuitously, the owner of that interest must shoulder
the burden of the income. If the income interest and remainder have
been purchased, the remainderman is chosen to pay the tax by being
equated with a borrower who has purchased the fee simple on credit
even though no loan exists.
Sales and Gifts in Combination
The extent to which the government's position is supported by artifi-
cial notions is made clear if we consider a combination of gratuitous
and nongratuitous cases. Suppose, e.g., that X transfers Blackacre to
T in trust to pay A the income up to $50X, the trust then to end and
Blackacre to be conveyed by T to B. If the interests of both A and B
are acquired by gift, A clearly is taxed on all the income. But suppose
only A's interest is acquired by gift, B having purchased his remainder
interest from X. Are the provisions of subchapter J now to be con-
sidered overridden by section 636 (b) (if Blackacre is mineral property)
or Bryant (if Blackacre is not mineral property)? On the one hand
such a case is no different from the situation where X sells a remainder
and retains a production payment. Surely section 636(b) or the Bryant
holding cannot be circumvented merely by X giving his production pay-
ment to someone else at the same time that the remainder is sold. But
if section 636(b) and Bryant apply to tax B on the income paid to A,
surely A will not also be taxed on such income without any amortization
under the provisions of subchapter J and section 273. From the point
of view of the government, of course, deferral loss would be avoided by
taxing either A or B, but that hardly solves the question of which of A
and B to tax. That question, however, cannot really be answered as
long as the conflict remains between the government's position in gratu-
itous and nongratuitous situations.
be lost to everyone. C acquires his basis by cost, not as a carryover from A (or
B). B will have only such part of the uniform basis as he acquired under section
1014 or section 1015, together with any increase therein due to the passage of
time, under section 1.1014-5(a) (2) of the regulations. The balance of the uni-
form basis must be allowed to A, or be lost to all concerned.
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If the combination just discussed presents an insoluble problem be-
cause of statutory or statutory/judicial inconsistencies, what of the con-
verse combination? Suppose, e.g., that A purchased the production
payment and B's remainder interest was gratuitously transferred. Now
who is taxed on all the income? B is not reached by section 636(b)
since there is no sale of mineral property; nor, for the same reason,
would Bryant seem to apply. A would be able to amortize since section
273 applies only to income interests which are gratuitously acquired.
The government would thus suffer deferral loss of the same type (and
for the same reason) involved in the AB situations covered by Bryant
and section 636(b).
The basic question would thus seem to be whether the deferral loss
which is still possible in this situation should be viewed as just a loop-
hole that has not been closed or rather as representing the proper result
which should prevail for all of the AB (and ABC) situations. Before
attempting an answer to that question, however, we will analyze the
judicial and congressional treatment of the BA transactions.
Carve Out or BA Transactions
In General
The carve out transaction is essentially the reverse of the AB trans-
action. Instead of viewing A as a fee owner who conveys a remainder
interest and reserves a production payment or term for years, B can be
seen as owning the fee interest and conveying to A a production pay-
ment or term for years. Hence, the BA transaction.
Until recently, the issue which has been litigated with respect to the
carve out is whether B's gain on the amount received from A was capital
gains or ordinary income. This issue was settled by the Supreme Court
in Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc."'4 which held B's gain to be ordinary
income. 15 Apparently not presented as an issue in P.G. Lake was the
question of whether the transaction was properly characterized as a
loan from A to B, to be repaid by the production payment. In such
case, the common assumption is that B's receipt of the proceeds is not a
taxable event and that B is taxable on the income from the property
which is used to repay the loan from A. A, of course, has basis offset
to prevent him from being taxed on any more than the interest on the
loan.
154 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
15 For a detailed discussion of the capital gains-ordinary income issue, see Lyon
& Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake
Case, 17 TAx L. REV. 295 (1962); Del Cotto, "Property" in the Capital Asset
Definition: Influence of "Fruit and Tree," 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1965).
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In P.G. Lake, the taxpayer, B, reported the transaction as a sale,'15
producing income in the year the proceeds were received, and both the
Commissioner and the Supreme Court accepted the characterization of
the transaction. Indeed, in General Counsel's Memorandum 24849 15
the Service had taken the position that:
Assignments of income rights by the earner for cash or other property,
measured by the then worth of such rights, may not be disregarded, and as
respects such earner-assignor, he has elected to anticipate normal realiza-
tion by assigning or discounting such right. Consideration received by him
represents ordinary income realized by him upon anticipatory assignment
of his right to income.1 8
Although this ruling deals with the capital gains-ordinary income
issue on assignment of oil payments for consideration, in holding such
consideration to be ordinary income the ruling also stresses that the
assignor "has elected to anticipate normal realization" and that the
"consideration received" represents income. Also, A, the assignee of
the oil payment is characterized as a "purchaser" of "property rights,"
with a basis in his hands equal to the consideration paid.' Thus, B is
a seller, who must account for any gain from the proceeds in the year
of the sale, and A is a purchaser, not a lender. The Service continued
to hold this position in Income Tax Ruling 4003 1 which held: "the
assignment for a consideration of any such in-oil payment right results
in the receipt of ordinary income by the assignor which is taxable to him
when received or accrued, depending upon the method of accounting
employed by him."' 0 '
In these rulings, the Service was treating the BA transaction not as a
loan, but as a "sale" and "purchase," requiring B to be taxed immedi-
ately on the receipt of the consideration from A, rather than taxing B
only as the property earned the income. This result prevents B from
deferring tax to future years and, in the usual case, is detrimental to B
and favorable to the government. Recently, however, the unusual case
has arisen where early taxation helps B and hurts the government. Such
"16 356 U.S. at 262.
:15 1946-1 C.B. 66.
11 Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
'2 Ibid.
160 1950-1 C.B. 10. Income Tax Ruling 4003 expanded the application of Gen-
eral Counsel's Memorandum 24849 from short lived carve outs to carve outs of
any length extending over a period less than the life of the underlying property
interest.
16' 1950-1 C.B. at 11 (emphasis added). But see Comm'r v. Slagter, 238 F.2d
901 (7th Cir. 1956), where, prior to the decision in P.G. Lake, the Commissioner
was upheld in characterizing the transaction as a loan.
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a case is Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner.62 The facts, briefly,
were that B, in 1964, paid a large federal tax deficiency plus interest
thereon. Because his 1964 income was not high enough to absorb the
resulting interest deduction, B tried to accelerate his future income into
the year 1964. He did this by assigning to his son all the dividends to
be declared and paid to him on certain stock owned by him until the
assignee received $122,820. His son paid him $115,000 in consider-
ation of the assignment and B included this amount in his 1964 income
as proceeds from the sale of the stock. He did not report as his income
amounts received by his son in 1965 under the assignment. The Com-
missioner asserted that the 1965 receipts of his son were income to B
in 1965.
The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner1"3 concluding that the
"whole undertaking, though conducted in the form of an assignment of
a property right, was in reality a loan to petitioner masquerading as a
sale and so disguised lacked any business purpose."1"' The "lack of
business purpose" language is an apparent response to, and agreement
with, the Commissioner's position that the assignment had "no com-
mercial substance for tax purposes, but was designed solely to circum-
vent the payment of . proper taxes."1 5 The reasoning of the Tax
Court, however, was "that the transaction in dispute was not a bona
fide sale but merely an anticipatory assignment of the undeclared divi-
dend income to an intermediary, decedent's son, for collection and was
devoid of any substantive purpose other than tax avoidance.... In our
judgment, decedent still received the dividend income in 1965, albeit in
a more indirect fashion. In effect, the son-assignee merely acted as a
conduit for transmitting to decedent his dividend income when actually
paid in that year."6
In expanding upon this analysis the Tax Court relied on the principles
of Helvering v. Horst167 and Helvering v. Clifford108 to state:
[T]he 1964 assignment was of the fruit of the tree and not the assignment
of the tree itself. In other words, the decedent kept the "tree" and assigned
part of the "fruit." By retaining the stock, the decedent controlled the
source of the income and he directed its disposition in "assigning" or di-
verting it to his son. The alleged assignment did not result in any sub-
stantial change in decedent's dominion or control over the property. The
162 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).
163 Estate of Frank D. Stranahan, 30 T.C.M. 1078 (1971).
164 Id. at 1084.
165Id. at 1081.
1" ld. at 1082.
167311 U.S. 112 (1940).
168309 U.S. 331 (1940).
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decedent... merely exercised his power to dispose of the income. Under
these circumstances, there has been no effective separation of the "fruit"
from the "tree" and the decedent is clearly taxable on the income when
and as received by the son.' 69
The Tax Court was reversed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 70
which held the transaction to be a sale because the risks of ownership
of the dividends passed to the son.7'7 The assignment of income cases
relied on by the Tax Court were held inapplicable to a transfer for full
consideration.'7
2
Stranahan Under Perkins and Anderson
Stranahan represents a classic type of BA transaction which can
readily be analyzed under the now familiar principles of Perkins and
Anderson. Did B shift risks of ownership from himself to A? Clearly
A's only source for recovery of the consideration he paid was the future
dividends, if declared and paid. Failure of the stock to pay dividends
was a risk borne only by A, only he had the risk of loss. B had cashed
out all of his economic interest in such dividends and ended all risks
with respect to them. Therefore, the cash received by B was fully re-
alized in the tax sense-he had completely ended any relationship to,
and any investment he had in, the assigned dividends. Thus, B had
engaged in a taxable event and should account for any gain arising from
the consideration received.
What of the fact that the risks of not receiving dividends was so re-
mote that the consideration paid by A was computed merely as a dis-
count at the prevailing interest rate? The court of appeals met this point
by stating:
[I]t seems clear that risks, however remote, did in fact exist. The fact that
the risks did not materialize is irrelevant. Assessment of risks is a matter
of negotiation between the parties and is usually reflected in the terms of
the agreement. Since we are not in a position to evaluate those terms, and
since we are not aware of any terms which dilute the son's dependence on
the dividends alone to return his investment, we cannot say he does not
bear the risks of ownership. 173
Perkins would agree with Stranahan that B could not be taxed on the
dividends received by A, because B had no economic interest in the
dividends. If B had pledged the underlying stock as security for pay-
16330 T.C.M. at 1083.




1-3 472 F.2d at 871.
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ment of $122,820 in absence of dividends or if B had personally guaran-
teed such security, however, then Anderson would tax B on the divi-
dends received by A because of A's right to be paid in all events from
B's independent assets. T7 In such case there would be no sale by B to
A, but a loan from A to B with B retaining his economic interest in the
assigned dividends.
The effect of Anderson will be developed at greater length shortly.
What we wish to stress here is the nature of the transaction and the tax
consequences to A and B. Essentially, A is always conveying a present
interest in his property for a right to future payments from B's property.
Usually A conveys money for a right to future money. If A's interest is
secured within the principle of Anderson, then receipt of the future
money (i.e., the dividends) simply repays A for his advance to B, plus
interest. Although A has a right to the dividends as such, since he is
not totally dependent upon them, the dividends are income to B and
are received by A as repayment of a loan to B, with interest. 17"
If, on the other hand, A's sole source of recovery for the amounts
conveyed to B is the income from the property, without any security by
way of a mortgage on the property or otherwise, then A has no right of
repayment from B. The transaction is not a loan to B to be repaid either
from the property's income or B's independent assets, rather, it is a sale
by B of future income from property in return for a purchase price paid
therefor by A. As held in Stranahan, B has ended his risks in whether
A will in fact receive what he purchased, and B should account for the
purchase price in the year he receives it.176
17 See, e.g., Christie v. United States, 436 F.2d 1216 (5th Cir. 1971), and
cases cited therein.
175 The interest is ordinary income under United States v. Midland-Ross Corp.,
381 U.S. 54 (1965).
176 So viewed, the terms "sale" and "loan" are being used as if they describe
mutually exclusive transactions, with the implication that there is only a single
taxable event requiring a symmetry of treatment both as between A and B, and
also as to each of A and B separately. Thus, B is viewed as having engaged in
either a sale or a borrowing, the result turning on whether Anderson views B as
keeping the risks of payments to A. This view is, however, misleading. If Ander-
son applies to B then certainly he will be required to include in his income the
payments made to A, but this does not tell us how B should treat the initial
amount received from A. To call it a loan is to beg the question, because a loan
can be viewed as a sale of money by A in return for a promise by B to repay,
giving B immediate gain in the full amount received due to a zero basis in B's
promise to repay. Such treatment would require that B receive a loss deduction
when his debt to A is discharged by A's receipt of the production payments. See
Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965-2 C.B. 50. Accordingly, B's gain on A's receipt of the
payments would not be taxed (disregarding interest which would be washed by a
deduction in any event). To call such a sale a loan, then, is merely to reflect
common agreement that B should not treat the receipt of money from A as a
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Martin v. Commissioner and Hydrometals,
Inc. v. Commissioner: Effect of Anderson
In Martin v. Comnissioner 1" the taxpayer (B) owned an apartment
building. In 1966, in order to utilize a loss for that year, B assigned
$225,000 of future rents payable by its tenants, plus 7 percent on the
outstanding balance, receiving in consideration $225,000 from the as-
signee, A. B in no way guaranteed the rents would be collected, but did
agree to pay all bills and obligations of the apartments and to keep them
open and operating in a businesslike manner for a period of two years.
B also agreed to repair or reconstruct the apartment building in the
event of its partial or total destruction, and in such event the two year
period was extended for the period the apartments would be closed.lTh
taxable event and thus have no tax consequences whatsoever due to receipt of it.
Accordingly, as the debt is satisfied by the production payments to A, B has in-
come in the full amount of the production payments. If, on the other hand, we
have facts such as in Stranahan, where Anderson does not apply to B. then there
is only one taxable event to B and only one opportunity to tax B-on the receipt
of money from A. Here, B is said to have sold the production payment, and he
has in fact done so by ending all risks in it. Most importantly, B must be taxed
at the time of the sale since, under Perkins. he cannot be taxed as A receives the
production payments. This, of course, is the holding of Stranahan.
Turning to A, the tax treatment to be given him does not depend on how B is
treated. Whatever A conveys to B, cash or appreciated property, A has engaged
in a sale. This is clear when Anderson does not apply to B, as in Stranahan. A
has ended all risks, retaining not even a security interest in the property he con-
veys, and A has acquired the risks of a different asset, the right to production
payments. For example, if A conveys Blackacre to B for the right to rents from
Whiteacre, B's property, for a period of years, A has sold Blackacre just as B
has sold the rentals from Whiteacre. Each must account for gain or loss at that
time.
Where the Anderson principle does apply to B because A keeps a security
interest in, or B's personal liability for the value of, the property conveyed, A
has nevertheless engaged in a sale of the property, whether it be cash or Black-
acre, because his right to payment for the property is not limited to Blackacre
or the cash conveyed; rather, A has two sources for payment, primarily the pro-
duction payments, secondarily the property conveyed, and, under the Anderson
principle, A has engaged in a sale of whatever property A conveys. The fact that
B is not taxed on receipt of the cash from A, or of Blackacre from A. because
we call it a loan as to B, in no way affects the fact that Anderson treats A as a
seller. Nor is it relevant to A's situation that Anderson also requires B to include
as income the production payments received by A since B includes them as owner
of the property while A includes them as proceeds from a sale. To illustrate,
using the above example, suppose A conveys Blackacre to B for rentals from
Whiteacre totaling $100X, secured by a mortgage on IVhiteacre (or Blackacre).
B, of course, is treated simply as purchasing Blackacre on credit-i.e., as a bor-
rower by way of a purchase money mortgage-and does not include the value of
Blackacre in his income. A, nevertheless, has engaged in a sale of Blackacre.
- 469 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1972), affirining without opinion J.A. Martin, 56
T.C. 1255 (1971).
1-8 56 T.C. at 1257.
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The Commissioner characterized the transaction as a loan from A to
B so that B was required to include as 1967 income the $225,000 re-
ceived by A as rentals in that year. The Tax Court agreed, relying on
the assignment of income cases,. 7  No reliance was placed on Ander-
son. The court of appeals in Stranahan, however, although it did not
cite Anderson, did distinguish Martin from Stranahan "as there the
premises were required to remain open for two full years' rental opera-
tion, suggesting a guarantee toward repayment." 1o
What then is the effect of this guarantee in Martin? It is certainly
not an assumption of any risk by B that the apartments will in fact earn
rents, or that the tenants will pay them. Indeed, B did not even covenant
to collect the rents, and expressly stated he did not guarantee their col-
lection.' B did, however, agree to operate the apartments and pay its
bills so the rents could be earned, and to repair or reconstruct them, if
necessary.
Like the agreement by B to pay for utilities in Alstores Realty, B's
duty to pay the bills and obligations of the apartment business does not
make B the economic beneflicary of the rentals received by A. Payment
of the bills is a cost to B of the consideration paid by A for the rentals,
i.e., a cost of the amount realized from A, and should reduce the amount
realized by B. '1 2 It is a fixed cost that does not depend on the actual
presence of rental income; B would not be relieved of the obligation to
any extent by production of rents. Thus, B had nothing to gain from
presence of rental income and nothing to lose from a lack of such in-
come. These risks of loss are borne by A and B has only a fixed cost to
provide a service which A has paid for as part of his purchase price
(which presumably would have been reduced somewhat if A had to
perform these tasks himself).
An identical analysis applies to B's duty to perform, or supply, ser-
vices to provide management for the apartments. B has sold A services
as well as rentals and the cost of providing services is a fixed cost to B,
not dependent on rentals. Thus, the obligation will not be reduced or
removed by the presence of rents. Like payment of utilities, the services
are necessary to production of the rentals, but the cost of providing
them does not depend on the presence of rents. Therefore, B is not the
economic beneficiary of the rents.
The agreement by B to repair or reconstruct the apartments in the
event of partial or total destruction, on the other hand, is similar to B's
179 56 T.C. at 1259-260.
11o 472 F.2d at 871 (emphasis added).
"" 56 T.C. at 1257.
182See, e.g., Baker v. United States, 514 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1975); Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-2(e). Cf. cases cited in N. 125 supra.
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obligation in Alstores Realty to pay A the rental value in the event of
A's ouster by act of God. This is not a fixed obligation which is un-
affected by the presence of rents. So long as the apartment building
remains undestroyed, this obligation remains inchoate and therefore B
is benefited (i.e., relieved of the obligation) by the rental payments.
The extent of the benefit, as in Alstores Realty, is properly measured by
the cost of an insurance policy protecting against any destruction of the
apartment house. To this limited extent, the amount received from A
should be treated as a loan rather than proceeds of a sale, reportable by
B as rental payments are received by A, and reducing pro tanto the
amount taxable to B as proceeds from the sale of rentals. Or, as a prac-
tical matter, the risks may be disregarded on the ground of remoteness.
By no means, however, is there a guarantee by B that A will receive all
rentals due him in all events. In Martin, therefore, B should not be
treated as a recipient of a loan in the full amount payable to A, as sug-
gested by the court's distinguishing of Martin in Stranahan.
Hydrometals, Inc. v. Commissioner 1 appears to involve an at-
tempted application of the Anderson principle. B, in order to utilize the
last year of a net operating loss carry forward, assigned to A $1.3 mil-
lion, plus interest on the unpaid balance, in consideration of A paying
to B $1.3 million. The assignment to A was payable solely from B's
manufacturing revenues. B had no personal liability for the payment
and made the usual covenants with respect to operating the business,
paying business debts and repairs.' A had borrowed the S 1.3 million
from C, a bank, assigning the production payment as security for the
loan. Without more, the facts of Hydrometals are fully analyzed by the
discussion of Stranahan and Martin. Anderson has limited, if any, ap-
plication to B and B has sold the production payment, rather than being
the recipient of a loan from A. The Tax Court, however, found that B
was the recipient of a loan from C, through A, to be repaid from the
production payment. The reason, apparently, for this holding was the
conclusion of the Tax Court that B "left for safekeeping with [C] cer-
tificates of deposit for $1,300,000 which it had purchased with proceeds
it received from the loan made by [C] to [A]. There was in effect an
agreement between [B] and the bank that these certificates would be
maintained until [A] had repaid the $1,300,000 to [C]." 11
163485 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1973), affirming per curiam Hydrometals, Inc., 31
T.C.M. 1260 (1973).
1131 T.C.M. at 1263.
1"1d. at 1265 (emphasis added). A second ground for the holding was the
lack of "real possibility" that the manufacturing revenues would be insufficient
to make the loan repayment to the bank. Ibid. See discussion on this point in
text accompanying Ns. 173-76 supra in connection with the analysis of Stranahan.
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If B had in fact guaranteed to C repayment of A's borrowing from C,
and if A had no personal liability on the loan against which B would
have recourse, then neither A nor C would bear the risks of the produc-
tion payment. B would have pledged his own separate property and
continued to be the economic beneficiary of the production payments
made to A."86 However, whether in Hydrometals there was such an
agreement on B's part is dubious. B did use the proceeds of C's loan to
A to buy certificates of deposit from C and apparently did agree to
leave them in C's possession until their maturity, but nowhere agreed
they could be used to satisfy A's debt to C.11 Hydrometals would thus
appear to be a questionable application of Anderson. Indeed, the Tax
Court nowhere stated any reliance on Anderson, but did expressly rely
on Martin, stating that the holding of that case was correct, and should
be followed in Hydrometals.8 s
So, Stranahan appears to be the only one of the three BA cases which
is properly decided under a risk-benefit notion."8 9 Martin and Hydro-
metals tax B as the recipient of the production payment, even though
he has no risks of loss with respect to the production payment and is
not a borrower from A on the security thereof. Again, albeit in an un-
perceived way, B is being taxed on gain due to the increase in value of
his remainder interest as A receives the production payments, a treat-
ment of B for which there is no authority.
Relationship of the Assignment of
Income Doctrine to the BA Transaction
The Tax Court's decisions in Stranahan, Martin and Hydrometals
have been bottomed on the anticipatory assignment of income doc-
trine.190 Basically, the Tax Court has invoked such cases as Horst, Clif-
"'See, e.g., Comm'r v. Estate of Donnell, 427 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1969).
1 r31 T.C.M. at 1263, 1264. Cf. George H. Landreth, 50 T.C. 803 (1968);
Holbrook v. Comm'r, 451 F.2d 134, petition for rehearing denied, 451 F.2d
1350 (5th Cir. 1971) (B's guarantee of A's debt to C gives B no economic inter-
est in the production payment where B has a right of subrogation against A).
18831 T.C.M. at 1265.
's9 Anderson is properly applied to a situation where B pledges his independent
assets, by way of a mortgage or his personal liability, securing payout to A in the
amount of the production payment conveyed to A. Also, the type of transaction
in Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Comm'r, 198 F.2d 357 (2d. Cir. 1952), can be
seen as a common garden variety Anderson situation. There, B owned appreciated
property and borrowed $400,000 from A, without personal liability, but secured
by a mortgage on the property. Although A did not receive a production pay-
ment as such, it is easily seen that the presence of rentals from the property enrich
B by enabling him to amortize the mortgage and free the remainder from the
burden of the mortgage.
9
'See 56 T.C. at 1259-60; 30 T.C.M. at 1082.
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ford and Lucas v. EarlI to find that B is taxable on the production
payments in the year they are received by A, thus preventing accelera-
tion of that income by B to a prior year.
Suppose B owns the fee simple in Blackacre and makes a gratuitous
conveyance to A of a certain number of dollars from rentals of Black-
acre. This is the factual pattern which has traditionally been within the
domain of the assignment of income doctrine. B can avoid being taxed
on A's receipts if he takes certain precautions."*-' Lacking such pre-
cautions, B might very well be taxed on the rentals paid to A 1t13 and A
will not be taxed.14 When B is not taxed (and A is taxed), it is be-
cause the assignment of income doctrine is not being applied, and the
normal rule of taxation is applied, i.e., only A is taxed because it is only
A who is the economic beneficiary of the income received by him.
When, however, B is taxed under the assignment of income doctrine,
he is taxed (and A is not) despite the fact that A, not B, is the economic
beneficiary. In both situations it is only A who bears the entire risk of
Blackacre paying the assigned rentals and, yet, under the assignment of
income doctrine A avoids the tax and B does not.
Thus, the assignment of income doctrine is seen as the very antithesis
of the risk-benefit notions embodied in the principles of Perkins and
Anderson. That doctrine embodies an overriding principle which super-
sedes risk-benefit notions in favor of preservation of the tax rates of a
progressive income tax.
The methodology by which the doctrine accomplishes its purpose is
to employ a legal fiction: B is the owner of the property (Blackacre)
producing the income and he is therefore the recipient of the income,
which he pays over to A as a tax-free gift of corpus. " ' Hence, B is taxed
on the income in the year it is collected by A, the assignee.""' The
overall purpose of this methodology is to determine who, i.e., which of
A and B, should be taxed on the income received by A. Its only effect
"91281 U.S. 111 (1930).
192 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 673. Cf. Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
93See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Gait v. Comm'r, 216
F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954); I.R.C. § 673.
194 I.R.C. § 102(a); Reg. § 1.102-1(e).
' See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 671-677. Section 671 states: "Where it is specified...
that the grantor... shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust, there
shall be included in computing the taxable income and credits of the grantor...
those items of income, deductions and credits against tax of the trust which are
attributable to that portion of the trust."
9
, Rev. Rul. 69-102, 1969-1 C.B. 32. See also 30 T.C.M. at 1082 (held B
taxable on the income "when and as received by the son"); Harrison v. Schaffner,
312 U.S. 579 (1941); Austin v. Comm'r, 161 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1947). Cf.
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
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is to change the taxpayer from A to B in order to prevent spreading of
income among related persons. It does not change the taxable event,
i.e., the time of taxation. B is taxed only when A receives the income.
To what extent is this doctrine viable when B conveys a production
payment to A, not as a gift, but for fair consideration? Clearly B is
achieving no exclusion from his gross income of the value of the rentals
assigned to A, much less total exclusion. The receipt by B of fair con-
sideration should be enough to render the assignment of income doctrine
inapplicable.197 The purpose of this doctrine is to make B the taxpayer
and here this purpose is accomplished under risk-benefit notions by tax-
ing B on the consideration paid by A. Furthermore, it is not the purpose
of the assignment of income doctrine to change the when of taxation-
i.e., to a year other than the year of actual receipt. Therefore, it should
not be applied as it was by the Tax Court in Stranahan, Martin and
Hydrometals to tax B as A receives the production payments.
There is an argument, of course, that the Stranahan-type carve out is
within the broad reach of the assignment of income doctrine: By ac-
celerating his receipt of income, B in effect achieves an exclusion from
gross income due to the ability to utilize an otherwise wasted deduction
and thus frustrates the progressive income tax. It is submitted, however,
that in the historical development of the assignment of income doctrine,
the doctrine has not been viewed as reaching cases of acceleration of
income. In dealing with carve outs, the Service has taken the position
that B is taxable upon the consideration received from A 108 and in doing
so has distinguished the assignment of income cases:
The issue presented by such assignments of expected income between
strangers in interest, presumptively at their present worth, should not be
confused with the question presented in such cases as Lucas v. Earl . . .
Helvering v. Horst . . . and Helvering v. Eubank . . . involving donative
assignments of income by the earner thereof in an attempt to divide his
income between himself and members of his family. There the earner-
assignor's attempt is to avoid realization of expected income. Here the
assignor expedites such realization.1"
In other words, there is no justification for applying the assignment
of income doctrine where the assignor receives a fair consideration and
117 It was so held in Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner, 471 F.2d 867, at
870 (6th Cir. 1973).JP G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 C.B. 66; I.T. 4003, 1950-1 C.B. 10.
199 G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 C.B. at 67-68 (emphasis added). See also Income
Tax Ruling 4003, 1950-1 C.B. 10, 11, which makes the same basic distinction:
A B who is a gratuitous assignor of a carve out is taxed when A receives the in-
come; a B who conveys a carve out for fair consideration is taxable on the con-
sideration when received.
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in fact expedites rather than avoids realization of the income.
Similarly, if B, owner of Blackacre, enters into a ten year lease of
Blackacre to A and A prepays the rents for the full term, B, if he is a
cash basis taxpayer, must include such rents as income on receipt.*-"
The year of inclusion is not seen as an issue of assignment of income,
but only as an accounting issue: how properly to report an advance
receipt under the taxpayer's method of accounting. And yet this situ-
ation is no different in substance from the transaction in Martin, where
B, instead of receiving rent prepayments from his tenants, received the
value of the future rentals from A. The issue is still one only of account-
ing and does not involve the assignment of income doctrine unless that
doctrine is to be distorted beyond recognition. Where B receives fair
consideration for a carve out, he is not attempting to shift income to
other persons, and the problem is not within the purview of the assign-
ment of income doctrine.0 1
Congress and the BA Transaction
In 1961, Congress enacted section 636(a) which, in pertinent part,
provides: "A production payment carved out of mineral property shall
be treated for purposes of this subtitle, as if it were a mortgage loan on
the property, and shall not qualify as a mineral interest in property."
The reasons for this statute, originally proposed by the Treasury in
1969,202 and eventually adopted by both the House "' 3 and Senate ' " in
enacting section 636(a), are fully discussed in the Treasttrv Proposals:
Under present law, the seller of the production payment receives de-
pletable income in the year of the sale. But the expenses of producing the
income necessary to pay off the production payment are then claimed as
2
-°See, e.g., Reg. § 1.61-8(b); Kohler-Campbell Corp. v. United States, 298
F.2d 911 (4th Cir. 1962); Astor Holding Co. v. Comm'r, 135 F.2d 47 (5th Cir.
1943). Cf. Clinton Hotel Realty Corp. v. Comm'r, 128 F.2d 968 (5th Cir.
1942); Warren Service Corp. v. Comm'r, 110 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1940).
_01The assignment of income cases have been used by the Supreme Court in
cases where B sells a carved-out production payment for a fair consideration (see,
e.g., Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958)), but for the pur-
pose of deciding the capital gains-ordinary income issue, not in order to prevent
acceleration of the income by B. Also, the pertinency of the assignment of in-
come cases even on the issue of the nature of gain is criticized in Del Cotto,
"'Property" In The Capital Asset Definition: Influence of "Fruit and Tree," 15
BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1965). Cf. Lyon & Eustice, Assignent of Income: Fruit
and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAx L. REv. 295 (1962).
2
.
2 See TREASURY PROPOSALS, at 256-60.
203 H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 138-42 (1969).
21°S. RE. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 182-87 (1969).
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deductions in the subsequent years when the mineral is produced. Thus
income and the expenses attributable thereto are mismatched with a con-
sequent distortion of income in each of the years involved.
This mismatching has produced tax benefits that are far in excess of the
advantage Congress intended to grant. First, the sale of the carved-out
production payment is used to obtain a greater percentage depletion allow-
ance than Congress intended to grant. In the case of percentage depletion,
the present rules provide that the deduction with respect to any mineral
property shall not exceed 50 percent of the net income (before depletion)
for the taxable year from the property. That is, the maximum benefit to
be derived from percentage depletion during any one year is to cut in half
the taxable income from a mineral property.
But the use of carved-out production payments has vitiated this statutory
limitation of 50 percent. For example, assume that a corporation derives
all of its income from a lead mine which it operates at a profit of $1 mil-
lion each year, having $10 million each year in gross income and $9 million
of expenses. Before applying the 50 percent limitation, the percentage de-
pletion deduction would be $2,300,000 (23 percent of $10 million) but
the 50-percent limitation in the statute limits the percentage depletion de-
duction in this case to $500,000 (50 percent of the net profit of $1 mil-
lion). Thus, if the company operates its mine in a normal manner it would
pay Federal income taxes of approximately $240,000 and the percentage
depletion deduction would have reduced its taxable income each year to
one-half of what it would otherwise be. But, by resort to carved-out pro-
duction payments, the company can drastically alter its tax picture. If it
sells an $8 million production payment payable out of the following year's
production, the percentage depletion allowance in the year of sale is in-
creased from $500,000 to $4,140,000 (23 percent of $18 million). This
result follows because the $8 million is treated not as a loan, but as income
subject to the depletion allowance in the year of the sale. While the com-
pany will pay Federal income taxes in the year of sale of approximately
$2.3 million, these are claimtd as refunds in the following year when the
company will claim a net operating loss carryback of $7 million. (This
results from the fact that the $8 million production payment is excluded
from income by the seller in the following year, leaving $2 million gross
income and $9 million in expenses.) Thus, by the simple expedient of
selling a production payment, the corporation has eliminated payment of
Federal income taxes over the 2-year period of approximately $480,000.
Yet for its book purposes it has continued to show a $1 million operating
profit. Each year the corporation repeats this cycle, it can continue in a
tax-free status.
The net result of the use of production payments in the manner de-
scribed is to permit a mineral operator to obtain the benefit of the depletion
allowance far in excess of 50 percent of the profit derived from a mineral
property and to distort the purposes of the net operating loss carryback
and carryforward provisions. This impact is even greater if, in the above
example, the corporation had nondepletable income to absorb the unused
portion of the "loss" in the year of the payout of the production payment. 20 5
205 TREASURY PROPOSALS, at 257-58.
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In the mineral area, then, the Treasury viewed the sale of carved-out
production payments as producing a mismatch of income (which is in-
cluded by the seller (B) in the year of the sale) with expenses (which
are deducted by the seller in the subsequent production years), which
mismatch created an unintended distortion in the depletion deduction.
In effect, a large deduction is manufactured out of whole cloth since, as
demonstrated by the above-quoted example, it would not exist in such
an inflated amount without anticipation of mineral income through sale
of the production payment.
The solution to this problem, i.e., section 636(a), was described by
the Treasury:
Under the proposal, the seller of a carved-out production payment will
be required to match the income from the production payment with the
expenses incurred to generate that income. This result will be accomplished
by treating the transaction as a loan. Thus, in the year of the "sale" of
the production payment, the owner of the working interest will not take
the proceeds into income. In the year(s) in which the production pay-
ment is paid off, the income used to make the payment will be depletable
income in the hands of the operator and he will be allowed a deduction for
the expenses incurred to produce the income. The corollary of this rule
is that the "purchaser" of this production payment does not have an eco-
nomic interest in the mineral production; therefore, the income he receives
is not subject to depletion. However, his tax position will not be changed
from present law, since his receipts will constitute a non-taxable return of
principal and taxable interest ....
This proposal will also correct an existing disparate treatment of pro-
duction payments. Under present rules, if the "'seller" of the production
payment guarantees the payout of a production payment, the transaction
is treated as a loan. The seller does not report the proceeds as income in
the year of "sale," and he pays out the production payment with depletable
taxable income. This same result will now obtain whether the production
payment is guaranteed or not.2 0-°
Thus, section 636(a) treats a carved-out production payment as a
mortgage loan on the property irrespective of whether the seller, B, se-
cures the payment thereof with a mortgage. "'0
To what extent does the rationale behind section 636(a) apply to
sales of carved-out production payments of nonmineral properties? The
mismatching of income and expenses is a problem which may be entirely
absent as in Stranahan (sale of future cash dividends on stock) or may
be present to a greater or lesser extent as in Martin (sale of apartment
rentals) and Hydrometals (sale of manufacturing revenues). This leg
of the Treasury's rationale does not, however, quite reach nonmineral
carve outs because there will not be created an inflated deduction as
2  Id. at 259-60.
207rSee Reg. § 1.636-1(a) (3) Ex. 1.
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occurs with depletion. The interest deduction in Stranahan, for example,
did not depend upon the acceleration of income from a later year to the
year of sale as does the depletion deduction in sales of mineral carve
outs. The interest deduction, then, is not allowed in a greater amount
than Congress intended to grant. - 8
More importantly, the second reason used by the Treasury to give
loan treatment to carve outs, and the one without which section 636(a)
cannot be justified, will not stand analysis. As quoted above, in dis-
cussing the proposed section 636(a), the Treasury says that the statute
will treat the nonsecured production payment in the same manner as
one that is guaranteed, as a loan-suggesting that the two situations are
indistinguishable in legal effect. As noted in our discussion of section
636(b) (with respect to the AB and ABC transactions) the Treasury
had argued elsewhere that "[t]he essence of a lending transaction is not
affected by the nature of the security interest involved"209 thereby ren-
dering Perkins and Anderson indistinguishable. Our discussion through-
out identifies such reasoning as clearly erroneous. Neither the rule of
section 636(a), nor the reasons behind it, are persuasive in analyzing
the proper tax effect of sales of nonsecured carved-out production pay-
ments, in the mineral area, and most certainly not with respect to such
sales of nonmineral property.
Summary and Conclusion
We began our discussion with the basic principle that the income
from property should be taxed to the person benefitted by that income.
Analysis of that principle in the AB and BA cases indicates that if the
income from particular property is paid to A it should be considered
income of A and not B, unless B has the risk of loss of such income. B
will have such risk either by acquiring it (in an AB case) or retaining
it (in a BA case) by virtue of some separate asset or assets of B being
burdened by an obligation to make payments to A, which obligation is
redeemed by the income generated and paid to A. Where B has such
risk of loss, the income from the property is properly considered as in-
come from the property as to B. As to A, it is properly considered as
payments from the sale of the property.
2 1 In any event a more proper solution to the problem of mismatch, and one
not involving a conflict with the Perkins-Anderson rationale, is a rule which
would require the expenses of production to be capitalized as a cost of the pro-
ceeds received on the sale of the carve out. See authorities cited in N. 182 supra.
Cf. the cases cited in N. 125 supra.
20 Memorandum Re Constitutionality of the Treasury Proposal Regarding the
Treatment of Production Payments, Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate
Committee on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 4617 (1969).
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The application of these principles has given rise to difficulty for the
government in both the AB and BA areas. In the AB area, the problem
is one of deferral loss. To refer again to a familiar example, assume A
owns a two year term for years in Blackacre and B owns the remainder.
Assume further that A's interest is worth $17X, B's remainder is worth
$83X, and the basis of both A and B is equal to the value of their re-
spective interests. If A, who is paid $1OX of rent in year 1, is allowed
to amortize his basis of $9X and B is not required to include any of the
$10X in his income, the government loses the tax on S9X for at least
year 1. The government's remedy, in the courts and in Congress, has
been to require some taxpayer (or taxpayers) to include all of the in-
come from the property without any amortization offset. Where A, who
is receiving the payments, has received his interest by gift or bequest,
it is A who must include all the income without amortization. In this
example, A would include for year 1 the entire $10X of rent without
an offsetting amortization deduction. Where, however, A has acquired
by purchase, and is seen therefore as clearly entitled to amortization, B
is required to include all income without amortization.
Where A has acquired by gift or bequest, it cannot be argued that he
is being taxed on gain which he does not have. Where payments to
such an A depend upon the presence of income, then he is the economic
beneficiary of such income and his only complaint is that section 273
distorts the gift and bequest exclusion by giving it entirely to B (the
remainderman), thus disallowing any amortization offset to A and re-
quiring A to include the entire amount of income. Where, however, A
is not prevented from amortizing by section 273 and the government
seeks to tax B under section 636(b) or as in Bryant, even though the
income received by A does not benefit B, a much different question is
presented. B's complaint is that he is being taxed on income that is not
his. And, as we have seen, under basic income tax principles, B's com-
plaint is justified.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that B is thereby being
taxed on more gain than he has had with respect to the particular prop-
erty, because, as we have seen, any increase in the value of B's remain-
der can be properly viewed as an element of economic gain. But, as we
have further seen, such increase in value does not give rise to gross in-
come to B in the absence of a provision like the 1969 amendment to
section 1232. Moreover, a statute taxing B on such increase in value
would necessarily require a continual valuation of the fee interest in the
underlying property because the value of a remainder is a direct func-
tion of the value of the entire fee interest in property. Thus, to tax B on
the payments received by A when B is not benefitted by them, is not only
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statutorily incorrect, but, not being tied to any value increase in B's re-
mainder interest, it may have the effect of taxing B on gain that he does
not have, a result which surely would raise constitutional questions. 210
Nor, as we pointed out in our preliminary analysis, does the govern-
ment's solution insure it against deferral loss. In terms of our example,
although B is treated as an owner in fee simple, and must therefore
include the $10X of rents for year 1 without an offsetting amortiza-
tion deduction, B is also treated as having borrowed $17X from A and
thus is allowed an offsetting interest deduction of $2X. This interest
deduction, however, is not fully reflected in A's income. Although A
must include $10X, he amortizes $9X, thus paying tax on only $1X.
How is the difference between B's $2X interest payment and A's tax-
able income of only $iX to be accounted for? B, having an outstand-
ing loan of $17X for year 1 is allowed (approximately) a $2X interest
deduction for year 1, as would a fee owner who actually borrowed $17X
to pay for the fee. But $IX of this $2X is not included by A, as it
represents the untaxed increase in value of A's term remainder in year 1.
Thus, A pays tax on $1X and B on $8X and the government still loses
present tax on $1 X.
We need not set forth precise calculations to indicate that the longer
A's interest and thus the larger B's loan, the higher B's interest deduction
and the greater the government's tax loss. The government's strategy
211 In its brief to the Supreme Court in Clay Brown, the government posited a
hypothetical where A transferred corporate stock to B subject to B's remitting to
A the dividends for a stated term of years or until a certain amount was remitted.
Of such a transaction the brief states in part:
The inappropriateness of treating the yield from A's retained income interest
in such a transaction-i.e., the annual dividends collected by B and paid over
to him-as payments of a "purchase price" taxable to A only as capital gains
is obvious enough. But even more incongruous would be the necessary corol-
lary to that treatment-namely, taxing B on the full amount of the dividends
collected by him notwithstanding his obligation to remit them to A .... The
total amount of the dividends collected by B and paid over to A is... wholly
unrelated to the value of the stock, either at the time of the transfer or at the
time B's "remainder" becomes possessory. The ultimate receipt of the stock
itself is, in turn, the only economic benefit that will ever accrue to B from the
transaction. To tax him on the dividends, therefore, would be to tax him on
amounts having no relation to any benefits realized by him. Whether or not
the meaning of "income" as used in the Sixteenth Amendment requires it, the
policy of the income-tax laws is to tax only values or benefits actually accruing
to a taxpayer. Taxing B on 40 years' dividends because he will have the full
beneficial ownership of the underlying stock at the end of that time could hardly
be reconciled with that policy.
Brief for Petitioner at 42-43, Comm'r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965). But see
Carr Staley, Inc. v. United States, 496 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir. 1974).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
ANALYSIS OF INCOME INTERESTS
in the AB area is, therefore, not only legally incorrect, but also ( 1 ) does
not entirely insure against deferral loss, and (2) to the extent that it
does, it does so haphazardly, i.e., depending on the extent of A's interest.
It should be observed, however, that the strategy of taxing B on in-
come payments which are made to A and which do not benefit B cor-
responds to the treatment accorded a taxpayer who owns all the interests
(the fee simple) in income producing property. Thus, the fee owner of
Blackacre is taxed on the full amount of rents despite the fact that his
gain attributable to those rents is only the amount of rents less what he
paid for the use of the property which produced the rents, any further
gain being due to whatever value increase has occurred in his remainder
in fee. If A, for example, owned the entire fee simple, he would be
taxed on $10X of rents for year 1, despite the fact that he paid $9X for
the $10X of rents.
This result is modified to the extent that such a fee owner is permitted
depreciation deductions, i.e., to the extent that the fee owner is con-
sidered the owner of an asset that is physically wearing out. This is
because where an income producing asset is physically wearing out it
is clearly recognized that the gross income it is producing is not all gain,
but is partially a return to the owner of the cost of the asset. The same
recognition that the gross product of the year is not the net product is
accorded the purchaser of an intangible asset which will produce income
for only a limited period, such as a patent where amortization is allowed.
And also, as we have seen, where a person has purchased a present
interest (income interest or production payment) in an asset which has
a longer income producing life than the interest purchased, such a per-
son is also recognized as having a return of cost or capital each year and
is allowed an amortization deduction. Thus, where A purchases a two
year term in Blackacre, or in a patent with a useful life of 17 years, A
is allowed to amortize his cost.
Where, however, a taxpayer owns all the interest in an asset that is
considered to have an unlimited income producing life (a fee simple
in Blackacre), the gross product each year (the ground rent) is arbi-
trarily considered the net product and is taxed in full with no amortiza-
tion allowed.211 The failure to accord proper basis by way of amorti-
zation to a fee owner is the result of the feudal concept of a fee as an
interest of perpetual duration. Thus, the purchaser of a fee is seen as
purchasing an infinite series of production units and his investment is
211 Such an approach is not only arbitrary, but is not even consistently applied
to fee owners. If, e.g., an owner who has purchased Blackacre for S100,000
leases it to another for one year in return for S10,000, retaining the remainder
in fee, no basis offset (amortization) is allowed. If instead he sells for SI0,000,
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seen as never wasting, resulting in the economically fallacious conclu-
sion that he has paid nothing for the gross product generated by the
asset in any given year.- r
However, even if such treatment of the owner in fee simple is
embedded in the tax law, this does not justify extending its treatment to
a taxpayer who has purchased only a future interest, not the entire fee
simple. In other words, even if B, who purchases a remainder in fee is
to be accorded the same tax treatment, when his remainder takes effect
in possession-that is accorded a taxpayer who has purchased the entire
fee from the beginning-this does not justify treating B the same as if he
did purchase the entire fee simple from the beginning. If, when B's re-
mainder becomes possessory, we are to treat his investment as never
wasting, we should not compound the error by requiring him to include
amounts in his income before his investment begins to pay off. The
proper treatment of B in such cases is to allow him to exclude the
amounts paid to A under the principle of Perkins, unless the amounts
benefit him in a way which renders him taxable under the principle of
Whitehouse and Anderson. Thus, in our example where A owns the two
year term and B the remainder, B should not be taxed on the $1 OX of
one tenth of the fee (geographically divided or not), and retains the fee in nine
tenths, he is allowed, in fact required, to allocate proper basis offset to the
amounts realized.
In such a case, it may also be objected that the tax consequences are deter-
mined without regard to the value of the remaining nine tenths of the fee. At
least, however, there has been proper recognition that one tenth of the fee sold
has an allocable cost basis, a fact which is not recognized where one year is sold
by way of leasing.212 In a recent case, Gordan P. Connolly, 34 T.C.M. 1379 (1975), the Com-
missioner allowed, indeed required, a taxpayer to allocate a portion of the cost
of his land to offset a lump-sum payment for a 99 year lease. The facts of Con-
nolly, simplified, were these:
Taxpayer purchased Blackacre for $10X. At an additional cost of $100X, he
erected a building on the land. Thereafter he entered into a 99 year lease of the
land and building in return for a payment of $120X, retaining a reversion in fee
simple. In a taxable year subsequent to the year of the lease transaction, tax-
payer sold his reversion for $20X. The taxpayer reported the 99 year lease trans-
action as giving rise to $20X of gain (offsetting the $120X lump-sum payment
with the entire $100X cost of the building). He reported the subsequent sale of
the reversion as giving rise to $10X of gain ($20X minus the $10X paid for the
land).
The Commissioner contended that the proper approach was to allocate a por-
tion of the aggregate basis of land and building ($IOX) to each transaction. Ac-
cordingly, he allocated 120/140 of the $11OX to the lease transaction since the
leasehold had sold for $120X and the value of the entire fee (leaschold and re-
version) was $140X. This resulted in gain of $26X (as opposed to $20X) on the
earlier lease transaction.
The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner on the authority of Welsh Homes,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1960), where the Fourth Circuit
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had upheld the Commissioner's approach in a situation viewed by the Tax Court
in Connolly as closely analogous. (It should be noted that although the Fourth
Circuit in Welsh Homes treated the case as involving a 99 year lease with a re-
tained reversion in fee, closer scrutiny of the facts indicates that the taxpayer-
seller in that case did not, in economic reality, retain a reversion. The 99 year
lease, for which the purchaser paid Si 1,250, was renewable forever by the pur-
chaser at a nominal rent of S96 a year. Moreover, after five years the purchaser
could relieve himself of the rental obligation and acquire a fee simple by redeem-
ing the rental obligation for an amount equal to the capitalized (at 6 percent)
value of $96 a year (say $2,000). The transaction was thus the economic equiva-
lent of a sale of the fee with a retained purchase money mortgage in an amount
equal to the present value, at 6 percent, of the right to S96 a year, the purchaser
having forever the election either to pay that amount, or to pay $96 a year for-
ever. This analysis was rejected by the Fourth Circuit, but in 1963 it was adopted
by Congress in sections 163(c) and 1055 of the Code. See S. REP. No. 72, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963).
In Connolly the Tax Court relied heavily on the following reasoning of the
Fourth Circuit in Welsh Homes:
Allocation of costs is normally employed for the establishment of a cost
basis of property when a taxpayer acquires an aggregate of assets for a single
unallocated purchase price and subsequently sells a portion of the whole ...
The pending case presents the reverse of the situation. The cost of the land
and the cost of the building, the constituent elements of the property which
the builder has acquired are known, but in the building operation they have
been incorporated into a single property and when a part interest in the whole
-the leasehold-is granted to the lessee and the reversionary interest or
ground rent is retained by the lessor, it is impossible to ascertain what part of
the value of these interests is attributable to the land and what part to the
building. It follows that the cost of land and building must be allocated be-
tween the interest granted and the interest retained. The taxpayer's contention
that the allocation of costs is not necessary must be rejected since it is based
on the mistaken notion that the purchaser of the leasehold acquires an interest
in the building but no interest in the land. In various types of situations, more
or less analogous to that in the pending case, the allocation of costs or expenses
has been approved when it is the only practicable method of reaching a fair
and equitable result .... In our opinion the costs were properly allocated in
computing the taxable gain in the instant suit.
It must be kept in mind that in the above excerpt, the court was responding
to the argument of the taxpayer-seller that he should be permitted to offset the
entire cost of his building against the payment for the leasehold. The court was
not responding to an argument, made by the Commissioner in the Tax Court but
apparently not pressed on appeal, that none of the cost of either land or building
should be allowed as a basis offset. Perhaps the reason this latter argument was
not pressed on appeal was that it had been rejected as "fantastic" by the Tax
Court. Be that as it may, the posture of the case on appeal made the choice
appear to be only between allowing the entire cost of the building as a basis offset
or only some allocable portion thereof. For the reasons stated above the Fourth
Circuit chose the latter.
The Tax Court in Connolly viewed themselves as being put by the parties in
the same position as the Fourth Circuit in Welsh Homes. As the Tax Court
stated: "We reemphasize what we have indicated at the outset of this opinion.
In view of the condition of this record we do no more than decide the narrow
issue presented by the parties. Our disposition of this issue follows the Welsh
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rents received each year by A. B would be taxed on those rents only
when A's term was over and B became the owner of the entire fee. 2 13
Homes computation. It is not intended as suggesting that the parties properly
analyzed the situation in presenting the issue as they did. [In a footnote the
Court continued]: Indeed, perplexing questions present themselves as to whether
any cost basis should be deducted from the amounts received in the light of such
cases as Crile v. Commissioner (1932 CCH 9068), 55 F.2d 804 (C.A. 6),
certiorari denied 287 U.S. 600, and Gates v. Helvering (4 U.S.T.C. 1237), 69
F.2d 277 (C.A. 8), but see Welsh Homes, Inc. (Dec. 23,568), 32 T.C. 239,
252-254."
In the cases referred to by the Tax Court it had been held that no basis offset
(of either land or building) should be permitted even where the taxpayer pur-
ports to sell the building and lease the fee for 99 years, since the payment re-
ceived was bonus rent.
Viewing the issues raised in Connolly as open questions, a persuasive argument
could be made for allowing (indeed requiring) the entire cost of the building to
be offset against the payment for a 99 year lease at least if the useful life of the
building was no less than the term of the lease. Moreover, if, in view of the
length of the lease and the value of the property (land or land and building),
the reversion is negligible, a further argument could be made that the entire basis
of both land and building should offset the amount paid for the Icasehold, which
in an arm's length transaction should closely approximate the fair market value
of the fee.
If, on the other hand, the length of the lease is such that only a portion of the
building is sold, there is no reason to allow any more than an allocable portion
of the building's basis to offset the payment for the lease.
Moreover, if there is anything more than a negligible reversion, it would be
an astounding turnabout in the law to allow any offset for the basis of the land
which is considered nondepreciable. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-2, 1.167(a)-5; cf. John
J. Sexton, 42 T.C. 1094 (1964). (As we have argued, however, the refusal to
allow an allocable portion as an offset will not withstand analysis.) Perhaps be-
cause of a fear that its opinion would be read as such a radical departure from
established principles, the Tax Court in Connolly, in approving the formula
which, as one of its features, allowed an offset of land basis against payment for
a leasehold interest, felt it necessary to say: "The conclusion we reach is based
strictly upon the issue as presented and as we understand it in the very dim light
of a most unsatisfactory record. In the circumstances our disposition of this case
can hardly have any useful precedential value in other cases where the matters
in controversy are more sharply brought into focus against the background of a
more clearly developed record."
211' In the patent area the proper result with respect to B has been reached by
allowing B to amortize dollar for dollar the amounts paid to A where A sells B
the patent for a percentage of the profits. In Associated Patentees, Inc., 4 T.C.
949 (1945), the taxpayer, who had acquired title to the patent for a consideration
of 80 percent of the yearly income from the use of the patent, paid over $42,000
in the first year to the seller. The Commissioner contended that this amount
should be capitalized and depreciated over the useful life of the patent. The Tax
Court stated its agreement that the amount must be capitalized but then went on
to hold that the taxpayer could deduct the full amount in the year paid as depreci-
ation of cost basis. "[T]he method urged by the [Commissioner]," said the Tax
Court, "might deny petitioner the recovery of its cost and would unquestionably
result in a distortion of income." 4 T.C. at 986. The Commissioner eventually
acquiesced.
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The government's position in the BA area suffers from the same doc-
trinal weakness as in the AB (and ABC) area. In attempting to tax B
on amounts received by A as proceeds of a carved-out production pay-
ment, both section 636 (a) and the Commissioner's stance in the decided
cases violate the principle of Anderson and Perkins. The Tax Court
perceives the issue as involving assignment of income problems and
essentially disregards risk-benefit notions in the decided cases. Also, the
same phenomenon is occurring in the newly emerging BA area as
occurred over many years in the AB (ABC) area: The government is
viewing each case only as a target of opportunity. B will normally be
given sale treatment for the transfer of the production payment and will
be taxed in the year the proceeds are received from A. Thus, B will not
get deferral advantage. If such treatment is to the government's dis-
advantage, however, the government apparently argues for loan conse-
quences to both the Congress and the courts. This mechanism requires
B to exclude the proceeds received from A and to include as income
the payments received by A in the years received. Like B in the AB
situation, the B in the BA situation is effectively taxed on a presumptive
increase in the value of his reserved remainder interest, without sanction
of statute. And the deferral allowed to B under this mechanism is, of
course, to his disadvantage.
Thus, in both the AB and the BA areas the government's test for the
distinction between sale and loan is essentially one of self-interest. The
risk-benefit theory has been submerged even though the government saw
it as the critical consideration in Clay Brown. Hopefully, we have not
come so far down the road that we cannot turn back to basic principles
of economics and taxation.
The result of inclusion, capitalization and 100 percent deduction is the same,
of course, as exclusion. It makes no difference to B which way it is done. (Nor
does it make a difference to A if he can get capital gains, a result assured for him
if he is within the provisions of section 1235. See N. 109 supra).
But a patent is a wasting asset; thus, Associated Patentees, Inc. would not be
considered precedent for B who has purchased a remainder in fee in a nonwasting
asset like land or stocks. Moreover, to follow the inclusion/deduction route of
Associated Patentees, Inc. with respect to B who purchased a remainder in fee
would be blatantly inconsistent with the treatment accorded a taxpayer who has
purchased the entire fee simple. The proper methodology, therefore, is an ex-
clusion by B.
It should be noted that in the ABC oil transactions, a wasting asset is involved.
If, therefore, B had not achieved exclusion as he did in Perkins, there is no reason
why he could not have reached the same result under the route of Associated
Patentees, Inc. Indeed, even under section 636(b) there is an argument that B
has dollar for dollar amortization against the amounts required to be included by
him under that section. Associated Patentees, Inc. would support such an argu-
ment, although the legislative history of section 636(b) does not contemplate it.
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